COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: A CASE STUDY OF THE
“TROUBLES” IN NORTHERN IRELAND
JULIANA VAN HOEVEN
“In Northern Ireland, the past is the present. If we don’t deal
with the past, I don’t want my grandchildren's rights to have
to suffer this again. As injured people, we are living scars in
society and we need to have it recognised that we have
suffered.“
– Peter Heathwood, paralyzed victim of a gunshot wound delivered
by suspected loyalist gunmen in September, 1979.1

1 Northern Ireland: Amnesty Slams Failure to Deal with Past, AMNESTY INT’L UK
PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-amnesty-slams-failure-deal-past [perma.cc/KN8B-TK9F]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Few outside of Northern Ireland realize that Belfast is a city still
divided by “peace walls,” physical barriers that were originally
constructed to divide the Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods
from one another.2 Belfast is possibly the last city in Western Europe
that does not preserve barrier walls solely for their allure as
historical novelties or their draw as tourist attractions.3 Rather,
nearly seventy percent of residents living near the Belfast walls want
them to remain in place because they believe the structures are still
necessary to prevent violence,4 though over two decades have
passed since the Irish Republican Army (“IRA”) announced the end
of its armed hostilities in Northern Ireland.5 Yet, although the
period of horrific violence known as the “Troubles” has been
declared over,6 the threat of aggression still looms in Belfast.7
2 Peter Geoghegan, Will Belfast ever have a Berlin Wall Moment and tear down its
peace walls?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2015, 02:30 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/sep/29/belfast-berlin-wall-moment-permanent-peace-walls
[perma.cc/WS2G-QZ9N] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); Henry McDonald, No end in
Sight for Belfast ‘Peace Walls,’ THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2012, 19:04 EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/sep/26/belfast-peace-walls-republicans-loyalists [https://perma.cc/33PL-R2EP] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); see also
Henry McDonald, Belfast ‘Peace Walls’ Will Come Down Only by Community Consent,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2013, 08:51 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/ uknews/2013/dec/03/belfast-peace-walls-dismantled-community-consent-minister
[perma.cc/DDD4-GJQT] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
3 McDonald, Belfast ‘Peace Walls’ Will Come Down Only by Community Consent,
supra note 2 (noting that Belfast’s peace walls are “highly unusual among such barriers around the world because most of those living closest to them continue to support their existence in successive opinion polls, mainly because of fear of attack
from the community on the other side”).
4 McDonald, No end in Sight for Belfast ‘Peace Walls,’ supra note 2.
5 Vincent Kearney, ‘It’s Over’: Reporting the IRA Ceasefire 20 Years Ago, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-28957532
[https://perma.cc/T8F3-WWY6] (last visited March 24, 2016).
6 Brian Lavery & Alan Cowell, I.R.A. Renounces Violence, Vows to Disarm, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/29/world/europe/irarenounces-use-of-violence-vows-to-disarm [https://perma.cc/N9T6-NP58] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2016) (the phrase “the Troubles” loosely refers to the period of near
constant violence as militant forces battled each other on the streets of Belfast from
roughly 1969 to1980).
7 Henry McDonald, Northern Ireland Drafts in Police Reinforcements After More
Violence, THE GUARDIAN (July 17, 2014, 07:00 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/jul/17/northern-ireland-police-belfast
[https://perma.cc/BB9F-69QD] (detailing five consecutive nights of violence in

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

1094

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:3

When the period of armed conflict officially drew to a close, the
death and destruction it rendered left many questions of blame and
reparations. In particular, some citizens of Northern Ireland wanted
to know more about the role of the police, the national army, and
their government in implementing counter-terrorism strategies
during the Troubles. Decades later, many of these questions remain
unanswered. Further, much of the civil and criminal litigation that
arose from these questions in the immediate aftermath of the
Troubles also remains unresolved, due, in large part, to the actions,
or lack thereof, of the British government. Through strategic
inactivity, as well as affirmative measures taken to ensure that the
cases are not investigated, the government has stymied efforts of
victims and their families to uncover the truth about the
government’s role in the Troubles. Why has this occurred?
The United Kingdom is an advanced Western nation with the
resources and ability to give all of its citizens access to judicial
remedies. Further, the United Kingdom does not lack the resources
needed to establish a large-scale public inquiry or to launch a truth
commission to address the resolution of Troubles-related violence.
It has the organizational capacity to install these or other
mechanisms of transitional justice, which many scholars have
argued could result in healing for post-conflict Northern Ireland.8
Transitional justice mechanisms are popular and innovative ideas
aimed at solving complex problems that have often raged for
centuries. The United Nations defines transitional justice as “the full
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s
attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
Belfast during the Marching Season of 2013. Rival political and sectarian groups
confronted each other all over the city, lighting cars on fire and throwing petrol
bombs. Five hundred additional police officers from overseas were called in to assist in calming the hostilities.).
8 Christopher K. Connolly, Living on the Past: The Role of Truth Commissions in
Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 401,
402 (2006) [hereinafter Connolly, Living on the Past] (arguing that “the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism that confronts the legacy of the Troubles is
crucial for the future of the peace process”); see Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1074, 1074 (2002-2003) (observing that “[c]urrently . . . the possibility of
holding public hearings, advancing societal and individual healing, and taking part
in or promoting a process of reconciliation (however defined) has opened wide the
question [of how best to gather information concerning transitional societies] . . . .”)
(quotation omitted).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/6

2016]

THE “TROUBLES” IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1095

reconciliation.”9 Mechanisms to achieve these goals include truth
commissions, prosecutorial initiatives, institutional reform and
national consultations.10 These practices, or a combination of them,
are often specifically tailored to meet the needs of the individual
country or region that has suffered violence. Typically, however, all
transitional justice mechanisms feature concurrent themes of
honesty and truth telling in the hope of healing past wounds and
reestablishing trust so that the citizens of a wounded region or
nation can begin to move forward.
The study of transitional justice has blossomed in the last
decade.11 Many academics posit that, as a land in transition,
inquests, truth commissions, or other mechanisms designed to
resolve the trauma experienced by post-conflict societies should be
applied in Northern Ireland.12 Currently, many questions about the
British government’s involvement in the violence still remain. Thus,
some feel that an organized process through which those involved
can acknowledge responsibility for the past conflict and perhaps
even apologize for the losses inflicted, will allow the still-divided
sectarian neighborhoods to begin to heal.13
9 Transitional Justice, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx? article_id=29 [perma.cc/2DGB-DVB2] (last visited Feb. 4,
2016).
10 Id.
11 See About the Journal, THE INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST., available at
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/ijtj/about.html
[https://perma.cc/G9RQ-JM7P] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (“Transitional justice
has fast emerged as a recognised field of policy expertise, research and law, and
today, is considered to be an academic discipline in its own right.”). Institutes that
have developed with a focus on transitional justice include the International Center
for Transitional Justice (see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DISPLACEMENT,
https://www.ictj.org/our-work/research/transitional-justice-and-displacement
[https://perma.cc/6598-JZGC] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016)), as well as the Transitional Justice Programme of the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocidal
studies (see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, http://www.niod.nl/en/projects/
transitional-justice-programme [https://perma.cc/Z7E3-B6SX] (last visited Mar.
18, 2016)).
12 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8; Hamber, supra note 8.
13 See, e.g., Patricia Lundy & Marck McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 J.L. &. SOC’Y 265 (June 2008) (arguing that transitional justice needs a more participatory approach and examining the Ardoyne
Commemoration Project for an example of an effective, organized truth-telling process that allows for the participation of families of victims of violence in Belfast to
tell the stories of their loved ones’ deaths); and ARDOYNE COMMEMORATION PROJECT,
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As a civilized Western government and self-proclaimed
advocate of peace, the government of the United Kingdom and the
ruling body of Northern Ireland should perhaps be one of the most
adamant proponents of achieving this tranquility within its
domain.14 Yet, as is often the case in transitioning societies,15 the
British government is one of the largest opponents of any further
investigation into the history of violence, even after judgments by
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) have commanded
such investigation.16 The United Kingdom has largely ignored the
ARDOYNE: THE UNTOLD TRUTH (2002), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/victims/ardoyne/ardoyne02a.htm [https://perma.cc/6ABA-E98B] (last visited Mar.
18, 2016) ( “Many of these testimonies speak of the brutality of a system that treated
ordinary people with utter contempt and colluded to ensure lack of disclosure, accountability and justice.”). See also Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges
for Truth Recovery in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1074,
1094 (noting that “at some point laying the past bare will be needed, and . . . this is
the greatest, albeit difficult, guarantee of a stable future . . .”). This view is by no
means universally accepted. Other historians have noted that “government initiatives to seek the 'truth' about historical events in Northern Ireland have both faced
and created severe practical problems.” Cillian McGratten, Historians in Post-Conflict Societies: Northern Ireland After the Troubles, HISTORY & POLICY (Mar. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/historiansin-post-conflict-societies-northern-ireland-after-the-troubles
[https://perma.cc/7GS4-L5XQ]. For example, judicial inquiries such as the Bloody
Sunday Tribunal may be helpful in establishing basic chronologies and cause-andeffect sequences, but they also serve to impose an authoritative narrative over victims' experiences.” Id.
14 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 13-14
(2013) (summarizing a news article featured in the Guardian, in which Prime Minister David Cameron notes that Britain has a long and exemplary record on human
rights).
15 Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South
Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1074, 1091 (noting that, in many
cases, “[t]he practical and political challenge of making policy on matters concerning those who have suffered . . . is compounded by the fact that . . . the government
is also responsible for some of the violence”); see also Connolly, Living on the Past,
supra note 8, at 418 (explaining that “notions of transitional justice assume state responsibility for the majority of past abuses”).
16 Northern Ireland: Amnesty Slams Failure to Deal with Past, AMNESTY INT’L UK
PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-amnesty-slams-failure-deal-past [perma.cc/KN8B-TK9F]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (the press release “blames the failure to deliver truth and
justice on a lack of political will from . . . the UK government”); see also Christine
Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1095, 1099 (20022003) (noting that “in Northern Ireland, key gaps in the issues being addressed,
such as accountability for State actors, can be identified as serving to undermine
the principles of equality and parity, which underlie the Agreement, and with
these, confidence in the peace process”).
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ECtHR judgments17 and has stubbornly dismissed any proposals for
implementing more widespread transitional justice mechanisms or
truth telling.18
Many have presumed that the reason for the lack of interest in
transitional justice displayed by the British government stems from
the fact that the government does not want to revisit its ugly past.19
Indeed, a thorough judicial process could expose the suspected
coercive role that the British Armed Forces may have played in the
bloodshed.20 Although the violence was predominantly isolated
within the United Kingdom, tensions within Northern Ireland
caused bloodshed in other parts of the European continent, which
could result in the perpetrators suffering widespread
embarrassment.21 22
Most assuredly, the latter interpretation for the government’s
inaction is correct, but perhaps other reasoning exists for this latency
as well. Unbidden, British Prime Minister David Cameron has
publicly apologized to the family of renowned Belfast human rights
attorney Pat Finucane for the “unacceptable” role that British forces
played in bringing about Finucane’s murder at the hands of militant

See infra Part 3.2. (discussing the effects of the judgments of the ECtHR).
See ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 14.
19 Northern Ireland: Victims Say “We’re an Embarrassment to Politicians, but We
Demand Action on the Past,” AMNESTY INT’L UK PRESS RELEASES, available at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-victims-say-wereembarrassment-politicians-we-demand-action-past [perma.cc/U9YM-698K] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2016) (suggesting that British politicians are embarrassed by the government’s past acts).
20 Some sources estimate that British state forces were directly responsible for
about ten percent of the deaths in Northern Ireland, and could have indirectly facilitated many more. Cillian McGratten, Historians in Post-Conflict Societies: Northern
Ireland After the Troubles, HISTORY & POLICY (Mar. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/historians-in-post-conflict-societies-northern-ireland-after-the-troubles [https://perma.cc/7GS4-L5XQ]
(noting that British state forces such as the army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary
were responsible for approximately 9.9% of the bloodshed during the Troubles).
21 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 417-18 (noting that “[r]ather than
accept responsibility for these deaths, Britain has generally ‘concealed and distorted’ the role of state actors in the conflict” (quoting TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, Henry J. Steiner, ed.)).
22 Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, supra note 14 at 922-25(describing violence
after British troops apprehended PIRA agents in Gibraltar).
17
18
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Protestants.23 Clearly, Cameron’s behavior demonstrates a degree
of willingness on behalf of the government to accept accountability
for such past acts. Yet, despite Cameron’s apology, the British
government still refuses to launch an official, independent and
transparent public inquiry into Finucane’s death.24 The government
declines to provide the details of its role in the tragedy that such an
investigation would reveal. Given that the British government has
accepted a measure of guilt by issuing its apology, why has the
adjudication of this case, along with so many other cases still
plagued by questions and mystery, been so evasive?25
The British government’s aversion to truth and its disregard for
the demands of the international human rights community may be
centered on more than just shame for its past misdeeds. A
widespread judicial investigation into counter-terrorist acts could
result in jurisprudence that defines, with specificity, which of those
actions are legally permissible and which are not. In the postSeptember 11th age, the rules of engagement regarding counterterrorist measures lie amidst murky and undefined judicial waters.26
Where clear rules do exist, governments have broken these rules and
justified the infringement in the name of domestic security. Like the
clearly defined rules themselves, determinations of the merits of
such self-defense arguments are equally obscure. Further, there is
an absence of meaningful official admonishment from domestic
judicial systems and larger international legal systems for
governments that violate these rules. This lack of clarity and
absence of retribution allows state actors considerable leeway to do
as they please in the name of defense against terrorism. A defined
body of jurisprudence could dispel the obscurity on which this
23 Henry McDonald & Owen Bowcott, David Cameron Admits “Shocking Levels
of Collusion” in Pat Finucane Murder, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2012, 16:17 EST),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/12/david-cameron-pat-finucanemurder[perma.cc/J79N-TA35] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
24 See id. (noting that the apology has “failed to quell demands ‘from [Finucane’s] family, human rights organizations [sic] and the Irish government for a full
public inquiry’”).
25 Id.; Henry McDonald, Pat Finucane Murder: PM’s Decision Not to Hold Independent Inquiry Upheld, The Guardian (June 26, 2015), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/26/pat-finucane-pms-decision-not-to-hold-independent-inquiry-upheld [https://perma.cc/F34D-PACC].
26 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 386 (2013)
(describing the international rules of terrorism as “unsettled” and noting that the
national and legal conceptions of terrorism vary significantly).
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unbounded system depends. This rationale could represent an
alternative reason for why the British government refuses to attend
to post-Troubles litigation.
Part 2 of this paper will briefly lay out the history of the conflict
in Northern Ireland, with a special emphasis on the time period of
the Troubles, when British Forces were most involved in the conflict;
in particular, this paper will outline the specific role the government
allegedly played.27 Part 3 will examine some of the judicial methods
that have been used to reveal the truth surrounding the British
government’s involvement in the Troubles. In particular, two
separate legal battles involving the murders of Pearse Jordan and
Pat Finucane will be discussed, because these cases aptly
demonstrate some of the challenges that families face when trying
to resolve historical murders that allegedly included government
involvement or assistance.28 Importantly, both cases also showcase
the interplay between domestic judicial mechanisms and
international judicial responses.
Ultimately, this paper will
demonstrate that despite numerous efforts to bring historical cases
to the attention of British authorities, to this day, domestic official
bodies have done little to rectify the barriers to justice that exist for
victims of the Troubles and their families. In the most extreme cases,
authorities have continued to actively oppose the judicial resolution
of these cases.
Part 4 will consider international human rights law and
humanitarian law in the context of the Troubles, and extrapolate the
analysis to include post-September 11th counter-terrorism measures.
The application and enforcement of human rights law in cases
involving counter-terrorism measures is important because
enforcement failures suggest that litigating the Troubles cases could
generate examples of how best to fill this enforcement gap. Finally,
Part 5 will discuss how litigating these historical cases could impact
not only the United Kingdom, but also counter-terrorism legislation
throughout the rest of the Western world. Ultimately, large gaps in
enforcement remain in the legal field which, if defined and filled,
could better clarify and standardize the rules of procedure when
human rights law conflicts with security interests and counterterrorism measures.
27
28

See infra Part 2.
See infra Part 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
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Counter-terrorism is a form of warfare that emphasizes secrecy
and clandestine acts, for obvious reasons of societal safety.
Monitoring and apprehending non-state actors is complex and
challenging, to say the least, because non-state actors, as well as their
supporters, often operate in the shadows. A strongly enforced body
of humanitarian law is needed to better define and protect the
participants in this technologically advanced age of warfare. This
paper will conclude by suggesting that, in an ideal world, the British
courts represent the best possible vehicle for litigating the Troubles
cases and enforcing this law, as the courts are not only well
respected by both the Parliament and the citizens of the United
Kingdom, but command international attention as well.29 Further,
because the majority of the strongest actors in the Troubles were
citizens of, or have ties to, the United Kingdom, a system within the
same country is more likely to understand the complexities of the
conflict and to be respected by the actors involved, even though the
same governmental organ contributed to the bloodshed. Despite a
tumultuous past, allowing a stable and secure nation to deal with its
own can be an important part of the healing process. Briefly,
possible mitigating solutions such as amnesty, or the preservation
of anonymity for all who come forward to recount their roles in the
violence of the Troubles will be considered as mechanisms to assist
the courts in achieving governmental participation.30
Ultimately, litigating the historical cases of the Troubles is
important, not only because interested victims and their families
deserve resolution, but also because the cases can have a wider
impact on current counter-terrorism protocol. The cases are
representative of many of the problems that the aftermath of broad,
sweeping strokes of counter-terrorism can generate. Drawing
attention to the individual cases is important, but through them
there may also be acknowledgement of the broader wrongdoing of
the British government in its counter-terrorism strategy which is
essential. It is this wide attention to government transgressions that
could beneficially contribute to international human rights law as a
whole.31
It is important to note that this paper’s proposals are in relation
to broader human rights literature.
Restrictions on what
29
30
31

See infra Conclusion.
Id.
Id.
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government actors may and may not do in the course of armed
conflict certainly exist in the form of humanitarian law.32 The
Geneva Conventions are perhaps the most well-known example of
war-time human rights law, and there has been a large push
towards enforcing this type of legislation in unofficial armed
conflict, both within and across borders. However, enforcement
remains a difficult problem to tackle, as will be discussed further
below. Identifying the actors, communicating human rights
obligations to them, and enforcing those obligations have rarely
been accomplished with success, especially in advance of the acts
that we seek to preempt. Thus, “the resort to international tribunals,
national courts or regional bodies” is common.33 Particularly with
state actors such as the United Kingdom and the United States,
international law often comes secondary to domestic law and there
is an unparalleled emphasis on domestic security. This attitude
promotes the absence of enforcement.34 Because the Troubles cases
uniquely impact the United Kingdom,35 they are perhaps singular in
that they represent a predominantly concluded but still partially
unsettled36 modern opportunity for domestic courts to incorporate
international humanitarian law in relation to counter-terrorism
measures.
Northern Ireland is in a state of transition, and increasingly, in a
state of hope. The infringements on civil rights embodied by
seemingly small measures such as checkpoints and government
enforced curfews, as well as the horrific infringements caused by the
violence of near daily sectarian killings that once haunted the region,
are a thing of the past.37 Everywhere, people talk of the progress

32 Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, supra note 14 at 70 (noting that a rich body
of legal rules and principles has developed over time).
33 Id. at 383.
34 Id.
35 Nearly all of the actors are citizens of the United Kingdom.
36 Alec Forss, Winning the Peace in Northern Ireland, PEACE DIRECT; INSIGHT ON
CONFLICT (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.insightonconflict.org/2015/12/winningpeace-northern-ireland/ [https://perma.cc/S8XM-STDL] (noting that “[p]aramilitary groupings, albeit on a lesser scale compared to the past, continue to instill fear
among communities and engage in gangland-style violence, with punishment attacks and even murder occurring openly on the streets”).
37 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 402. The last sectarian killing
occurred in 2002. See Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommendations

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

1102

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:3

that Northern Ireland as a whole has made.38 They do not
emphasize only the roles of Catholics, or only the roles of
Protestants. Similarly, this paper strives to avoid adopting a
sectarian position.39 Rather, it focuses on the role of the British
government against the people of Northern Ireland generally,
regardless of what religion they happened to be, or which political
stance they took. A government has a duty to protect its people, and
the British government did a disservice to both “sides” by
abandoning this duty. To make up for this flagrant abandonment,
the actors in this conflict need to resolve the Troubles litigation in a
way that not only provides closure and lasting peace, but also in a
way that inspires hope for peace in the aftermath of other conflicts
as well. Admittedly, this is a tall order.
This paper does not seek to propose a solution that injects
humanitarian law into counter-terrorism measures in a forwardlooking way. Simply put, it does not and certainly cannot seek to
rectify all of the world’s problems going forward by predicting the
humanitarian rules that should be applicable in the macabre game
of terrorism and counter-terrorism. No one would follow them
anyway – that is the point of terrorism. Rather, this paper seeks to
suggest effective mechanisms to promote healing and perhaps to
mitigate damages, or at least understand that they are being
inflicted, which is an important dialogue that should transpire.
2. BACKGROUND & HISTORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND
The history of tension between the Irish and the English is
ancient, going back to before the 12th century, with the series of
(Nov. 2012), available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU]
(stating that “Gerard Lawlor was the last Catholic civilian to be shot dead as a result
of the Northern Ireland conflict” on July 22, 2002).
38 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 402.
39 Of course, readers may disagree with my efforts, or with the notion that such
a thing as impartiality is even possible when it comes to any recounting of the Troubles. I tend to agree that impartiality is impossible when the history of Northern
Ireland is discussed, but it should nevertheless remain a lofty goal. In the astute
words of Ciarán MacAirt as he introduced his book, The McGurk’s Bar Bombing,
“history before and history since, has been a contest in itself. A similar contest may
even be played out between the pages of this book – between writer and reader . . .
.” As did MacAirt, I am aware of those tensions. I ask only that readers bear witness to my humble attempts to retell a history so essential to a modern understanding of the conflict moving forward.
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Norman invasions into the Emerald Isle that first brought it under
English rule.40 As time progressed, the northeastern province of
Ireland known as Ulster was predominantly settled by Scottish and
English immigrants.41 Ulster became economically more viable than
the rest of the island, which remained Irish, and therefore the British
found Ulster a more desirable foothold. In 1690, Protestant King
William of Orange defeated the deposed Catholic King James II in a
fierce and decisive battle outside of Dublin and took control of the
country.42 Known as the Battle of the Boyne, Protestants in Northern
Ireland celebrate the victory over the local Irish and predominantly
Catholic forces to this day, with a series of parade marches leading
up to the July 12th anniversary.43 Over time, Catholics have
responded with their own demonstrations and marches to
symbolize their displeasure with the conquering “invaders.” This
annual tradition of parades is known as the Marching Season, and
is a period that is emotionally charged and prone to violence.44
Despite the near-constant references to religion, the
contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland is largely political, not
religious, in nature. However, one’s religion is often an accurate

40 “For Republicans the twelfth century Norman invasions, sixteenth century
Surrender and Re-grant treaties and Nine Years’ War, and seventeenth and eighteenth century plantations and penal laws provide grounds for their struggle against
the Loyalists.” Laura K. Donahue, Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy:
Lessons from the United Kingdom, 8 (BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-05, Aug. 2000).
The sixteenth century risings by the Irish Catholics, the 1689 Siege of Derry, the
1690 Battle of the Boyne, and agrarian risings throughout the eighteenth century
supply the basis for Loyalist claims. Id.
41 See BBC, Wars & Conflict: The Plantation User (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/plantation/
[https://perma.cc/U2PDVGE7] (discussing the “plantation of Ulster” by English and Scottish Protestants on
land confiscated from the Gaelic Irish).
42 More Information About: The Battle of the Boyne, BBC HISTORY, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/battle_of_the_boyne
[perma.cc/2XGXR7UT] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
43 Id.
44 See Henry McDonald, 3,000 Police Deployed for Climax of Northern Ireland’s
Marching Season, THE GUARDIAN (July 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
uk-news/2015/jul/13/3000-police-northern-irelands-marching-season
[https://perma.cc/ZB8R-6WS3] (describing precautions taken for the 2015 marching season as well as violence in the 2013 parades, which resulted in “widespread
rioting and disorder, with dozens of police officers injured in the violence”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

1104

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:3

indicator of one’s views on the divisive conflict.45 Before the
Republic of Ireland was established, “Protestants and Catholics
divided into two warring camps over the issue of Irish home rule.
Most Irish Catholics desired complete independence from Britain,
but Irish Protestants feared living in a country ruled by a Catholic
majority.”46 Great Britain also had a pronounced economic interest
in maintaining control over the wealthy Ulster province, and so
threw its support behind the Protestant Irishmen who disfavored
home rule. After a series of rebellions in 1798, 1803, 1848, 1867 and
1916, and the Irish War of Independence from 1919 to 1921,47 it was
agreed that the twenty-six southern counties of Ireland would be
severed from British rule with the option to form their own country,
now the Republic of Ireland.48 The remaining six counties, together
forming Ulster, would remain under British domain.49 The split
regarding the number of counties is what now explains the
mathematically puzzling slogan of those who support one unified
Irish republic, “26 + 6 = 1.”50
After the divide, Ulster was ruled by a, largely British, Protestant
majority that was fiercely loyal to the idea of remaining under
British rule; hence, supporters of Protestant interests are known as
“Loyalists,” much like the “Loyalists” of the American Revolution
who supported British rule as well. The Protestant majority
instituted policies of discrimination all across Ulster to subdue the
Catholics, who continued to support the rebellious idea of joining
Ulster with the rest of the Republic of Ireland. Consequently, they
are often called “Republicans.” The discrimination generally
included depriving Catholics of voting rights, as well as access to
45 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 405; see also More Information
About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ troubles [perma.cc/8ZZN-XHFN] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (noting that this was a territorial conflict, not a religious one).
46 The Northern Irish Conflict, A Chronology, INFOPLEASE, available at
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/northireland1.html [perma.cc/FFF2-2SY2] (last
visited Mar. 30, 2016).
47 Id.
48 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 411. See also Donahue, supra note
40, p. 2 (explaining that the agreement was struck to alleviate the drain on British
resources and to placate some of the demands in Ireland).
49 Id.
50 Joseph E. Thompson, America’s Role in the Northern Ireland Peace Process, in
DIASPORA LOBBIES AND THE US GOVERNMENT: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN
MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (Josh DeWind & Renata Segura eds., 2014).
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housing, employment and education. Pogroms also resulted in the
burning and destruction of Catholic homes and businesses across
the region.51 The pro-British Northern Irish government instituted
additional security measures to consolidate its control over Ulster.
In particular, the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act
(“SPA”) “empowered the Northern Ireland Parliament to impose a
curfew; proscribe organizations; censor printed, audio, and visual
materials; ban meetings, processions and gatherings; restrict the
movement of individuals to within specific areas; and detain and
intern suspects without bringing charges.”52 The SPA also
authorized police to exercise broad powers of entry, search and
seizure.53 Though meant to be a temporary measure, the SPA soon
“became a necessity for maintaining the North’s constitutional
position.”54 After a period of relative calm,55 the SPA grew even
more contentious during the 1960’s, when American civil rights
movements inspired Catholics to protest not only against British
rule generally, but for rights equal to those enjoyed by Protestants
from a pure equality standpoint as well.
Ultimately, the violent thirty-year conflict known as the
“Troubles” was sparked by a Catholic civil rights march on October
5, 1968, in the town known as Derry to Catholics and called
Londonderry by Protestants.56
Local Protestants responded
51 CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVER-UP AND
A CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH 143-50 (2013) (describing the destruction of Catholic homes

and store fronts in predominantly Protestant towns in Ulster).
52 Laura K. Donahue, Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons
from the United Kingdom, BELFNER CENTER FOR SCI. & INT’L AFF., Discussion Paper
2000-05, at 4 (Aug. 2000), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication/2769/civil_liberties_terrorism_and_liberal_democracy.html
[https://perma.cc/2CSD-3GU6] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See Soldiers’ Stories, Northern Ireland Conflict, BBC HISTORY, available at
http://www.history.co.uk/shows/soldiers-stories/articles/northern-irelandconflict [https://perma.cc/F27X-ZPTW] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (“Calm prevailed for several decades in Northern Ireland, owed in large part to the rule of
Prime Minister Viscount Brookeborough, who was in office for 20 years. His political allegiance with the Ulster Unionists marginalised the Catholic minority both
socially and politically.”).
56 More
Information About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles [perma.cc/8ZZN-XHFN] (last visited
Mar. 30, 2016). The choice of which name to use was one way that Catholics and
Protestants could easily identify each other in the course of everyday life. Id. Thus,
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violently to the march and the situation quickly deteriorated.57
Catholics and Protestants across the country rapidly consolidated
their supporters and organized into pseudo-military groups that
had been coagulating organically for decades.58 Both groups began
to target militant actors, politicians, and civilians of the opposing
group alike,59 often regarding “kills” (attacks on anyone known to
be Protestant or Catholic that resulted in death) as badges of honor.60
Graffiti and large murals delineating the boundaries of the Catholic
and Protestant neighborhoods quickly sprang up, glorifying the
conflict and featuring portraits of the most vicious paramilitary
soldiers as heroes.61 Other themes indicating support for either side

purchasing a bus ticket to a location or mentioning the name of your hometown
involved an important political choice of which name to use, and would identify
your leanings to those around you instantly. Id.
Even the name of the state, Northern Ireland, has been highly politicized, with
fiercely Republican Catholics calling it the “north of Ireland” (indicating a geographic location and not a state) and British Protestants using “Northern Ireland,”
the terminology instituted to describe the state by the United Kingdom. Id.
57 Id. (by 1972, the situation had deteriorated so badly that the British government suspended the Northern Ireland parliament and imposed direct rule from
London).
58 The most famous of these remains the Catholic IRA (Irish Republican
Army), while predominant Protestant groups include the UDA (Ulster Defense Association), UDF (Ulster Defense Force) and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force). Id. See
Soldiers’ Stories, Northern Ireland Conflict, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www.history.co.uk/shows/soldiers-stories/articles/northern-ireland-conflict
[https://perma.cc/F27X-ZPTW] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“This descent into violence precipitated the need for armed forces on both sides.”).
59 Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder of Belfast Human Rights
Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 6,
3297, 3304 (2006) (“Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries killing each other was
not uncommon . . . and neither was the targeting of potentially innocent individuals
believed to support the paramilitary groups.”).
60 See Montgomery Sapone, Ceasefire: The Impact of Republican Political Culture
on the Ceasefire Process in Northern Ireland, Geo. Mason U.: The Network of Peace &
Conflict
Stud.,
available
at
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/
SAPONE71PCS.html [https://perma.cc/N4BN-W7K3] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016)
(“Another indication of the unchallenged legitimacy of armed struggle within the
Republican community is that the IRA has never suffered from a paucity of volunteers. While it may seem incomprehensible that Provisional IRA volunteers chose
to engage in military activities likely to result in death or imprisonment, to them
the choice appears not only necessary but desirable. Status in [the Northern Irish]
community is correlated with military competence. Bearing arms in the pursuit of
Irish autonomy is considered to be the ultimate expression of Republicanism.”).
61 Jeffrey A. Sluka, The Politics of Painting: Political Murals in Northern Ireland, in
THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE AND TERROR 190, 190-195 (Carolyn
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were also common, including images of William of Orange, the
Battle of the Boyne, and the Titanic (which held significance for the
Protestants as it was built by Protestant workers in Belfast)62 as well
as portraits of hunger strikers,63 entrapped doves, and IRA guerillas
firing weapons.64
The national government soon took action in an attempt to
achieve stability over the region by dissolving the Northern Ireland
regional government and instituting direct rule from London.65 The
new governmental system immediately utilized the regional
emergency legislation that had already been a feature of the
program to subdue Catholics in Northern Ireland.66 British troops

Nordstron & JoAnn Martin eds., (explaining that the murals “are important symbolic representations of the political conflict between the two ethnic communities”).
See id. (“Republicans in Northern Ireland have successfully adapted to the misfortune by transforming the tragedy of violent death into communal benefit. The spectacular funerals of slain IRA volunteers, the treatment of the 1981 hungerstrikers as
martyrs, and the murals glorifying the Republican dead all testify to the capacity of
Republicans to derive cultural value from politically motivated deaths. Violent
death is seen not just as a necessity of the armed struggle against the British, but as
a sacrifice which only serves to make the culture stronger. Although Republican
culture could be negatively described as "necrophilic," the sanctification of violent
death is a highly adaptive cultural practice within a militarized environment.”).
62 Sluka, supra note 61, at 194 (describing the themes common in Protestant
mural painting).
63 The term hunger strikers describes imprisoned Catholic activists who went
on hunger strikes during their imprisonment to protest their treatment as criminals
rather than as prisoners of war, with the attendant classification as political prisoners.
See Hunger Strikers in the Maze Prison, BBC HISTORY, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/republican_hunger_strikes_maze
[https://perma.cc/26FS-22NP] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). Arguably the most famous of these was hunger striker Bobby Sands. Id. Sands was also the first activist
to starve to death while in prison as a result of a hunger strike, though in total ten
prisoners would die before the strike ceased. Id. His portrait remains an extremely
common visual theme in Catholic murals. See Sluka at 198.
64 See Sluka at 198-99 (describing the themes common in Catholic murals).
Language and slogans on the murals included Gaelic language, quotes by and portraits of famous political figures, but also more ominous messages like “Warning!
Irish Republican Army-occupied territory, British Forces enter at own risk.” Id. at
204.
65 See Donahue, supra note 40, at 4 (noting that direct rule was instituted in
1972).
66 Id. at 3-4 (describing the use of emergency powers in Northern Ireland from
1922 onward).
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had previously been sent in to help restore order,67 and they began
to operate under these laws as well.68 So began the policy of direct
involvement of the British Forces with the armed paramilitary
groups of Northern Ireland, and the conflict that would eventually
claim upwards of 3,700 lives.69
2.1. Paramilitaries as Terrorists and the Implications of the Geneva
Conventions
The British government used the hostile situation to justify a
rapid resort to measures that undoubtedly constituted human rights
abuses in order to subdue the violence in Northern Ireland.70 As the
government’s tactics escalated, so did the Catholic resolve that
nothing short of British withdrawal from Ulster and Irish unification
would suffice.71
At the same time, British officials began to deny that the scenario
in Northern Ireland was a civil war and started to refer to IRA
paramilitaries exclusively as “terrorists.”72 The informal bands of

67 See On This Day 14 August, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/14/newsid_4075000/4075437.stm
[https://perma.cc/4T9S-CHW8] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
68 See Donahue, supra note 40, at 8 (“[T]here . . . existed a tendency within the
security forces to support the extension of such measures as part of their arsenal in
the fight against terrorism . . . .”).
69 Though this number may not seem large given the tragically vast scale of
modern violence, it is important to keep in mind the size of the Northern Irish population. 3,700 deaths would translate into roughly 500,000 had a conflict of the same
relative size occurred in the United States. Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note
8, at 411. To put this figure in perspective, 620,000 American soldiers died in the
Civil War, the bloodiest war in American history to date. In contrast, 644,000 soldiers have died in all the other wars that America has fought, combined. Civil War
Facts,
http://www.civilwar.org/education/civil-war-casualties.html
[https://perma.cc/CE37-MMCN] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
70 See also CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVERUP AND A CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH 64 (2013) (noting that “[a]s the security situation
continued to deteriorate, hard-liners in the Unionist Party pressed (Prime Minister)
Brian Faulkner to adopt much tougher measures, including the introduction of internment without trial”).
71 More Information About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles [perma.cc/8ZZN-XHFN] (last visited Mar. 30,
2016).
72 See MacAirt at 82-86 (describing how the British Government criticized news
reports for their political bias when reporting the violence, and pressured the Army
to take a more aggressive stance in managing the media. Pro-Republican press was
described as “terrorist propaganda,” while Whitehall’s information strategy was
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loyalist paramilitants, however, were often not similarly labeled.
Since the international community first endeavored to define
terrorism, there has always been debate on whether organized,
armed struggle by national liberation groups constituted
terrorism.73 Particularly during the time of the Troubles, the
definition of what constitutes terrorism was far from clear.74
However, the August 2004 United Nations resolution, Resolution
1566, defines terrorism in a way that can leave no doubt that, at least
in present day opinion, the non-state militant groups on both sides
of the struggle in Northern Ireland engaged in terrorism. The
resolution states that:
criminal acts, including [those] against civilians, committed
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or
taking of hostages, with the purpose to provide a state of
terror in the general public or in a group of person or
particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a
government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which
constitute . . . terrorism are under no circumstances
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature . .
. .75
The issue that many in Northern Ireland now have with the
decision to label the paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland as
terrorists is not, however, based on whether their conduct fits the
definition. Rather, some have now suggested that perhaps the
labeling was a calculated attempt to circumvent the Geneva
Conventions and other bodies of humanitarian law regulating
designed to increase support for the Security Forces and diminish popular enthusiasm for the Catholic paramilitaries.).
73 See PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 38384 (201) (3discussing the debate over the definition of a terrorist and the argument
that armed struggle posed by national liberation groups (of which the IRA is arguable a member) is not terrorism). Others argue that any definition that implies that
attacks on civilians could be excused in cases of armed resistance was insufficient.
Also of note is the discussion of the idea of “state terrorism” in which a government
might also be guilty of terrorism if it uses violence against civilians. Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 385.
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conduct in war.76 Similarly, the use of the phrase “the Troubles” to
describe the period of conflict in Northern Ireland is thought by
some to be an attempt to downplay the validity of what was in
actuality a war,77 thereby also circumventing a need to abide by
wartime rules and restrictions. The idea that governments would
use labels to deny the existence of an organized armed conflict is not
new. Rather, as Sandesh Sivakumaran discusses in his article on
armed opposition groups and humanitarian law, “even when there
is a reasonable claim that there is a protracted armed conflict,
governments often have denied the existence of a conflict, making
dialogue with the parties about the application of humanitarian law
rather problematic. . . .”78
Humanitarian law deals with the law of armed conflict, or the
More specifically, the Geneva Conventions
laws of war.79
“regulate[] the conduct of armed conflict and seek[] to limit its
effects. They specifically protect people who are not taking part in
the hostilities.”80 If the British government had declared a state of
civil war, then it would have been bound by international
agreements to minimize harm to civilians, protect wounded and sick
soldiers regardless of their side in the conflict, and treat prisoners of
war according to customary standards.81 However, by intentionally
failing to declare that an armed conflict existed, the British never felt
76 See MacAirt at 78, fn. 4, (“Just as we contest our shared history, so too do we
contest what we call periods in. our history. Many Unionists would decry the use
of the word “war” to describe the three decades of conflict in Norther of Ireland
from the late 1960s. Instead they would use the epithet “the Troubles” as “war”
would confer some form of legitimacy to what they would see as a breakdown of
law and order.”); see also Interview with Daniel Holder, Director, Committee for the
Administration of Justice, Belfast, Northern Ireland (June 2013).
77 See MacAirt at 78, fn. 4, (further explaining that “Republicans view the conflict as a war against oppression and a battle for freedom” and not an uprising or a
“breakdown of law and order”).
78 Id. at 78 (describing the internal policy to “fight terrorism with terrorism”);
see also PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 1500
(2013).
79 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 61-62
(2013).
80 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, International Committee of the Red Cross, (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/warand-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm [perma.cc/M3MW-EC27].
81 Id. (noting the Contentions’ enforcement of stringent rules with corresponding ramifications to protect against “grave breaches”).
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obligated to instruct their soldiers to abide by the Conventions, and
indeed would have been found in violation of them.
The IRA, meanwhile, issued an official statement declaring a
“war of attrition” on Great Britain, announcing that they would
continue fighting until Ulster could be politically independent and
free to rejoin the Republic of Ireland.82 Specifically, the IRA
explained that its goal was: “not to destroy the enemy, for that is
utopian, but it is indeed to force him, through a prolonged war of
psychological and physical attrition, to abandon our territory due to
exhaustion and isolation.”83 Prominent members of paramilitary
groups were relatively well known; they founded and/or endorsed
their political parties and took part in political processes.84 Often,
the groups took public responsibility through the media for the
deaths that their factions inflicted.85 They also hosted scheduled
training camps, marches and activities, maintained law and order in
their communities,86 and even published manuscripts, such as the

82 Ignacio Cuenca-Sanchez, The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the
IRA, 19 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 3 289, 295 (2007).
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday, BBC HISTORY, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/saville_inquiry_into_bloody_sunday
[https://perma.cc/72NZ-Q7YA] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (describing testimony
of witnesses to Bloody Sunday, including “that of Sinn Fein's chief negotiator Martin McGuinness. He confirmed in his statement to the inquiry that he was secondin-command of the IRA in Derry at the time of the Bloody Sunday shootings, the
first time he had acknowledged his IRA membership. At the time, McGuinness
was the serving education minister in the devolved Northern Irish government.”).
85 See, e.g., Finucane v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (2003), available
at
http://amnesties-prosecution-public-interest.co.uk/themainevent/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Finucane-v-United-Kingdom.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HAF4-Z94] (stating that a man “telephoned the press and stated
that the illegal loyalist paramilitary group the Ulster Freedom Fighters . . . claimed
responsibility for killing Patrick Finucane . . . .”).
86 Joshua Hammer, In Northern Ireland, Getting Past the Troubles, SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE (March 2009), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/peopleplaces/in-northern-ireland-getting-past-the-troubles-52862004/?no-ist (“During
the Troubles, IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries functioned as neighborhood security
forces, often keeping the two sides at bay.”).
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Green Book, which was distributed to all IRA volunteers.87 Fighters
on both sides received military-style funerals when they died.88
In short, there were clear actors in the Troubles on both sides.89
Although differentiating these actors from the general population
would have been difficult and time consuming, and inevitably
involve tragic mistakes, the British government could also have
focused exclusively on attacking the known forces of the sectarian
groups and made minimizing the destruction of civilian life a
priority. The British government could have taken appropriate
steps to mitigate its interference with the human rights of its own
citizens in Northern Ireland. The British government could, in short,
have made efforts to retain transparency and abide by its
international responsibilities. Instead, by labeling the entire
scenario as ‘terrorism,’ the government dove into the fray to the
point of inflicting its own terrorist acts by attacking civilians,90 as
discussed in more detail in the following Section.91 The British
government escalated a situation that would have massive
repercussions on its counter-terrorism activities decades into the
future.

RANDALL D. LAW, TERRORISM: A HISTORY (2009).
See Michael Stone Kills Three at IRA Funeral, BBC HISTORY, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/michael_stone_kills_three_at_ira_funerals [https://perma.cc/9857-HDE2] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (discussing several
funerals for both Catholic and Protestant forces).
89 See Violence in the Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/history/topics/troubles_violence [https://perma.cc/B5RH-67ND] (last
visited Mar. 30, 2016) (differentiating between civilian deaths and deaths of paramilitaries and military forces); see also Joshua Hammer, In Northern Ireland, Getting
Past the Troubles, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (March 2009), available at
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/in-northern-ireland-gettingpast-the-troubles-52862004/?no-ist (noting Martin McGuiness, Gerry Adams and
Ian Paisley as former commander of the IRA, leader of Sinn Fein and chairman of
the Democratic Unionist Party, respectively).
90 See BBC, Violence in the Troubles, (“British agents involved in such organizations (to capture and/or kill IRA volunteers) occasionally used assassination and
torture and became involved in criminal enterprises, a fact that lent covert operations the air of mafia undertakings. Widespread knowledge – or at least suspicion
– about the work of British commandos gave rise to the widely held opinion that
London was conducting a “dirty war” against Irish republicanism in Northern Ireland.”).
91 See infra Part 2.2. The Bloody Sunday massacre, is one such example of a
civilian attack during a civil rights movement, arguably designed to deter future
protests of a similar nature.
87
88
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2.2. The British Forces and International Human Rights Violations
In 1971, British parliament escalated the already existent
emergency measures and instituted a policy of “internment,” or
imprisonment without trial for any and all individuals suspected of
terrorist activities.92 In January of 1972, in what would infamously
become known as the Bloody Sunday Massacre, a British Parachute
regiment attacked a civil rights protest and left thirteen Catholic
In 1973, the Northern Ireland Emergency
civilians dead.93
Provisions Act (EPA) was passed, “retain[ing] the government’s
extensive powers of detention, proscription, entry, search and
seizure, restrictions on the use of vehicles, the blocking up of roads,
the closing of licensed premises, and the collection of information
on security forces.”94 Britain’s use of the EPA’s provision regarding
the collection of information about paramilitary group activities
would become particularly influential in the years to come.95 All of
these events contributed to the increased popularization and
expansion of anti-government sentiment, predominantly amongst
Catholics.96

92 See More Information About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles [perma.cc/ELW7-RECV] (last visited Mar. 30,
2016) (describing “[t]hirty years of conflict in Northern Ireland, 1968 – 1998.”).
93 See Archive: Bloody Sunday, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/history/bloody_sunday [perma.cc/ELW7-RECV] (last visited Mar. 30,
2016) (noting that an initial government inquiry exonerated the army of all wrongdoing, but an independent public inquiry ordered by Prime Minister Tony Blair in
1998 and finally reported in 2010 “established the innocence of the victims and laid
responsibility for what happened on the army”).
94 Donahue, supra note 40, at 4.
95 See infra, p. 22, discussing the use of the EPA as a basis for a variety of judicial
processes.
96 Shawn Pogatchnik, Soldier Arrested Over Rile in 1972 Bloody Sunday Massacre,
THE WORLD POST, (Nov. 11, 2015), available at http://www.huffingtonpost. com/entry/bloody-sunday-massacre-arrest_us_5642d50de4b08cda3486a546
[https://perma.cc/F3TG-PE7S] (“Bloody Sunday was a threshold event in Northern Ireland's conflict, driving radicalized Catholics into the ranks of the outlawed
IRA and its campaign to force Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom.”); see
also CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVER-UP AND A
CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH, introduction (2013) (describing the aversion of Sir Harry
Tuzo, General Officer commanding the British Army in Northern Ireland, to internment policies, as he knew they would incite anger and lead to further violence
amongst the general populace in Northern Ireland).
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The EPA was initially intended to be a temporary measure.97
However, in response to the “terrorist hostilities,” the EPA was
renewed.98 It eventually formed the basis for a judicial process that
established certain crimes as “scheduled offenses,” punishable
regardless of the motive of the perpetrator, or any other
surrounding circumstances of the alleged criminal activity.99 This in
turn gave rise to the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act, which instituted the use of now infamous “Diplock
Courts”: emergency trials held without a jury, often late at night in
the bowels of the jails.100 Diplock Courts became prevalent because
of their speed in convicting suspected paramilitaries, particularly
Catholics.101 Despite local criticism that the courts symbolized “the
mainstay of an emergency regime which many have condemned as
an affront to civil liberties,”102 the legislation imposing the Diplock
Courts has been renewed in a steady line of anti-terrorist legislation.
Distressingly, the courts remain available for use to this day, should
emergency situations arise, in much the same format as the courts
of the 1970’s and 80’s.103
Donahue, supra note 40, at 4.
Id. at 7.
99 Id.
100 See Christopher K. Connolly, Living on the Past: the Role of Truth Commissions
in Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
401, 415 [perma.cc/74WC-SVMJ] (describing Diplock courts as an abusive tactic,
“employed liberally, especially against the Catholic community”).
101 Id.
102 Sean Doran & John Jackson, Diplock Courts: A Model For British Justice?, THE
INDEPENDENT ( Sept. 12, 1995), http://www.independent.co.uk/money/ spendsave/diplock-courts-a-model-for-british-justice-1600830.html
[perma.cc/RMN6-F2W4].
103 In 2000, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was replicated by the aptly named
Terrorism Act 2000. This was then renewed with the Terrorism Act 2006, ensuring
that the Diplock Courts remained legal until 2007. Donahue, supra note 40. In 2007,
the courts were officially abolished, however, the practice continued, and in 2011,
Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State announced that it would continue for the foreseeable future, due to “political[] convenien[ce]” and the “dissident threat.” Barry
McCaffrey, Non-Jury Trials “Form of Normality,” THE DETAIL, 1 (11 April 2011),
http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/5/diplock-courts-story/non-jury-trials-form-ofnormality (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) [perma.cc/YT35-MXQD]. Since its inception,
over 10,000 defendants have passed through the Diplock system, amounting to approximately one third of all serious criminal cases coming out of Northern Ireland.
Sean Doran & John Jackson, Diplock Courts: A Model For British Justice?, THE
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 1995), http://www.independent. co.uk/money/spendsave/diplock-courts-a-model-for-british-justice-1600830.html [perma.cc/RMN6F2W4].
97
98
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The Diplock Courts were also criticized for serving to cover up
illegal government activity. In 1982, the non-jury courts were used
to clear members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary police force of
shooting six unarmed Catholic civilians.104 The courts also allegedly
turned a blind eye towards police methods of interrogation that
amounted to cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.105 Though
unrelated to the courts, allegations of unofficial “shoot-to-kill”
policies, in which British forces and the Ulster Police Force were
instructed to kill, rather than incapacitate or simply physically
detain suspects, spread rapidly.106 These methods were confirmed
years later, in international court hearings.107 Finally, collusion was
rampant. There was widespread sentiment that British forces would
look on and do nothing as Catholics were killed by Protestant
paramilitaries.108 More directly, British forces infiltrated the
104 Barry McCaffrey, Non-Jury Trials “Form of Normality,” THE DETAIL, 4 (11
April 2011), http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/5/diplock-courts-story/non-jurytrials-form-of-normality (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) [perma.cc/YT35-MXQD].
105 Sean Doran & John Jackson, Diplock Courts: A Model For British Justice?, THE
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 1995), http://www.independent.co.uk/money/ spendsave/diplock-courts-a-model-for-british-justice-1600830.html
[perma.cc/RMN6-F2W4] (noting that “the courts were accused by some of turning
a blind eye to dubious police interrogation practices that routinely produced a prosecutor's ticket to conviction in the shape of a confession”); see also Ian Cobain, Guy
Grandjean, Maggie O’Kane, Teresa Smith, An RUC Interrogator Speaks: Northern Ireland’s Forced Confessions Revealed, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2010)
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/video/ 2010/oct/11/northern-ireland-policetorture?CMP=twt_gu [perma.cc/2YBW-2UEV] (noting that:

[h]undreds of men and women found guilty of terrorism during the Troubles in Northern Ireland are planning to appeal. Most of them were convicted on the basis of confessions they say were beaten out of them by
police. A Guardian investigation has uncovered evidence from former
police interrogators that the brutality was routine and sanctioned at a very
high level.).
106 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 415-16 (“In the mid-1980s, the
Stalker Investigation into the actions of the RUC and British Army allegedly uncovered the existence of a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy in regard to members of the IRA.”).
107 See, e.g., PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,
922-25 (2013) (articulating the judgment in McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, in
which the Court notes that all four British soldiers shot to kill IRA agents in Gibraltar after receiving inaccurate information about an alleged car bomb).
108 See Martin Melaugh, Collusion- Chronology of events in the Stevens Inquiries,
CAIN WEB SERVICE, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm
[https://perma.cc/E4JE-8J4W] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); and Martin Melaugh,
Abstracts an Organizations – “F”, CAIN WEB SERVICE, available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/forgan.htm#fru [https://perma.cc/J36L-
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paramilitary forces as secret agents and then assisted them in
destroying each other,109 recruited mainly Protestant paramilitaries
as spies,110 and supplied Protestant forces with British Army
weaponry which was then used in attacks on Catholics.111 Any

HLLB] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (noting that Brian Nelson, a loyalist paramilitary
and double agent for the British, was believed to have been involved in at least
fifteen killings, fifteen attempted killings, and sixty-two conspiracies to kill during
the two years that he was handled by the British, but they failed to intervene to
protect any of the UDA’s victims, believing Nelson’s information was too valuable
to compromise. Republicans claim that the agency handling Nelson was colluding
with loyalist paramilitaries); See also, infra Part 3.2.1. (discussing Pat Finucane’s
death). British forces were aware of death threats against Finucane but did not establish any means of protecting the attorney, leading to accusations of collusion
between loyalist paramilitaries and the forces that killed Finucane. See Martin
Melaugh, Collusion – Chronology of Events in the Stevens Inquiries, CAIN WEB
SERVICES,
available
at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm
[https://perma.cc/GA8Z-E8ZC] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); see also Martin
Melaugh, Stevens Enquiry: Overview and Recommendations, 17 April 2003, CAIN WEB
Services, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/
stevens3summary.htm [https://perma.cc/5P2S-FV6L] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016);
see generally Britain’s Secret Terror Deals: ‘Truly disturbing’ BBC Panorama allegations
of collusion must be fully investigated, says Amnesty International, BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
(May 28, 2015), available at http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northernireland/britains-secret-terror-deals-truly-disturbing-bbc-panorama-allegations-ofcollusion-must-be-fully-investigated-says-amnesty-international-31261593.html
[https://perma.cc/8CJX-EHTX].
109 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 428 n.191 (describing that “Robert Hamill, a Catholic youth, was beaten to death by a Loyalist gang in 1997, allegedly within sight of an RUC patrol that failed to intervene.”); see also Robert Hamill
Inquiry, http://www.roberthamillinquiry.org [perma.cc/TT65-ETS4] (last visited
Feb. 13, 2006). Rosemary Nelson, a human rights lawyer, was killed when a bomb
attached to her car exploded in 1999. Prior to the murder she had been the recipient
of threats and abuse from RUC officers. See Rosemary Nelson Inquiry,
http://www.rosemarynelsoninquiry.org [perma.cc/Y9VU-FWLS] (last visited
Feb. 13, 2006). Billy Wright, jailed leader of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) paramilitary organization, was murdered by Republican fellow-prisoners under suspicious circumstances in 1997. See Billy Wright Inquiry, http://www.billywrightinquiry.org [perma.cc/7WLH-MU9R] (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
110 See Melaugh, (explaining that the Force Research Unit, a special unit of British Military Intelligence, sought to identify and recruit members of Republican and
Loyalist paramilitary groups who could be persuaded to work as double agents for
the Unit).
111 Ian Cobain, UK Accused of Helping to Supply Arms for Northern Ireland Loyalist
Killings, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/oct/15/uk-arms-northern-ireland-loyalist-massacre
[https://perma.cc/7J7U-9SXK] (“The Ministry of Defence and the Police Service of
Northern Ireland (PSNI) are being sued by relatives of six men murdered by a loyalist gunman . . . . The authorities are alleged to have assisted – or at least turned a
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available methodology “became seen as a critical part of the ongoing
fight against terrorism.”112 Naturally, everything was allegedly
done in the interest of stabilizing the region and procuring national
security.
The summary of human rights abuses that the British Armed
Forces engaged in is not only relevant as background information,
it is important for understanding the history of the conflict. The
impact of litigating the cases of victims who were subjected to these
particular abuses would no longer carry the same legal force of
weight if the remnants of these types of strategies were no longer in
use by the British government today. However, as this paper will
explore further, it is likely that the United Kingdom continues to
invade the rights of its citizens to privacy, fair trials, independent
investigations and the right to be free of arbitrary internment.113
For example, in 2010, litigants in two cases (one involving
mortgage fraud and another an armed robbery at Heathrow
Airport) lost the right to a trial by jury due to the remnants of the
Diplock Court system.114 They appealed the decisions.115 In July of
2013, a non-governmental organization, Privacy International,
blind eye – as about 300 automatic rifles and pistols, hundreds of grenades and an
estimated 30,000 rounds of ammunition were smuggled into Belfast in 1987.”).
112 Donahue, supra note 40.
113 See Concerns and Recommendations on the United Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 22, 2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/ human-rights-watch-concerns-and-recommendations-united-kingdom
[https://perma.cc/W9JZ-6SUV] (“Significant evidence that UK authorities were
complicit in torture and rendition to torture is already available. In 2009, Human
Rights Watch documented complicity by the UK security services in torture in Pakistan. In September 2011, our research also revealed that the UK security services
were complicit in the rendition of two prominent opponents of the Gaddafi regime,
Sami al-Saadi and Abdul Hakim Belhadj, to Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, despite knowledge that they were likely to be tortured. Criminal investigations into
both cases have been ongoing for several years with no public statements as to
when they will be concluded and if anyone will be prosecuted.”); see infra Part 4
(suggesting that because many known counter-terrorism measures of the Troubles
violate international law, and still others have remained undisclosed due to government fears of compromising current counter-terrorism efforts, it is reasonable to
suspect that current measures also infringe upon the internationally recognized
rights of civilians).
114 Barry McCaffrey, Non-Jury Trials “Form of Normality,” THE DETAIL, 4-5 (April
11, 2011), http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/5/diplock-courts-story/non-jury-trials-form-of-normality (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) [perma.cc/YT35-MXQD].
115 Id.
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launched legal action against the British government over alleged
privacy infringements.116 The suit alleges that the “UK Government
is accessing wide-ranging intelligence information from the U.S. and
is conducting mass surveillance on citizens across the UK,” and
furthermore that the government’s “expansive spying regime is
seemingly operated outside of the rule of law, lacks any
accountability, and is neither necessary nor proportionate.”117 The
progress of the proceedings is unknown; although initially filed in
administrative court, the plaintiffs were forced to file the claim with
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (“IPT”) at the government’s
insistence.118 The IPT is a secretive body that does not need to
publish its proceedings or justify the reasons for its decisions.119 The
last voluntary publication the IPT made was on a preliminary point
of law, adjacent to a larger proceeding, dated July 24, 2013.120
Transparent publications (or rulings) regarding citizens’ rights
to privacy, trials by jury, and other matters of human rights could
have an enormous impact on current proceedings in the United
Kingdom. A body of precedent by the tribunals involved would at
least establish the standard by which these types of alleged
violations are adjudged. Several other Western countries that
allegedly engage in similar practices might also take note of such
precedent, were it to exist. The historical cases of the Troubles are
an exemplar of human-rights related issues, and, if litigated, could
establish a body of jurisprudence with consistency and clarity. To
be sure, this would be an undertaking of great depth. However, it
could also prove that great consequences exist for the countries that
continue to commit such violations.
The outcome of a
116 Privacy International Files Legal Challenge against UK Government over Mass
Surveillance Programmes, PRIVACY INT’L 1 (July 8, 2013), available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/privacy-international-files-legal-challengeagainst-uk-government-over-mass [perma.cc/HE39-794R].
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Key IPT Rulings, INVESTIGATORY POWERS, available at http://www.iptuk.com/section.aspx?pageid=8 [https://perma.cc/N268-L7QU] (last visited Mar.
30, 2016) (clarifying that the IPT is actually required “not to disclose material provided to it which would threaten the national interest, national security, operations
against serious crime or any functions of the intelligence agencies”).
120 In the publication, the IPT declared that the covert recording of an interview
voluntarily given by a member of the public to a public authority figure did not
constitute “surveillance” under the meaning of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act of 2000. Id.
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comprehensive body of jurisprudence condemning this behavior, at
least in its most egregious forms, would serve to place shame and
condemnation on present day over-broad counter-terrorism activity
as it impacts citizen-civilian human rights.
The impact of counter-terrorism measures upon the rights of
armed opposition groups in accordance with humanitarian law is
more complex. Today, as was the case during the conflict in
Northern Ireland, suspected terrorists’ rights are more easily
infringed upon than civilians’ rights because of their identification
as “terrorists.” As discussed above, the question of whether an
armed conflict even exists against or between such groups can be a
convoluted issue. The natural consequence of such a question is
whether then, as now, a government engaged with those it identifies
as “terrorists” is required to at least attempt to abide by
humanitarian law whenever possible. Further at issue is whether
then, and now, such governments actively seek to evade the use of
humanitarian law to regulate their own conduct in the conflict.
Though modern allegations of human rights abuses had been
swirling for some time, in 2010 evidence surfaced that the
government of the United Kingdom was complicit in the internment
of UK citizens in Guantanamo Bay.121 British officials were also
collusive in CIA-led torture, including sleep-deprivation techniques
and water boarding for purposes of interrogation and other
reasons.122 At the end of 2013, the Gibson Report was published.
This internal investigative document announced that British
soldiers were clearly aware of, and complicit in, such activities for
years.123 The Report also absolved the British soldiers and their
superiors of any burden to report the torturous acts of other nonBritish actors, justifying this conclusion under the Geneva
121 Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture of
Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-detainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8].
122 Id.
123 See Concerns and Recommendations on the United Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 22, 2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/human-rights-watch-concerns-and-recommendations-united-kingdom
[https://perma.cc/W9JZ-6SUV] (“While the report does not reach any firm conclusions, it strongly suggests that UK security services, at least in some cases, were
aware that detainees were being tortured by foreign governments yet continued to
engage with them.”).
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Convention.124 Many human rights groups have questioned the
extent of the Report’s accuracy and bias.125 In a statement that may
have sounded eerily familiar to some in Northern Ireland, Jack
Straw, the former foreign secretary, urged Parliament never to
forget the context in which the collusion was committed, and noted
that “the allegations of torture arose in the ‘aftermath of the world's
most appalling terrorist atrocity ever, on 11 September 2001.”126 In
short, Straw’s message was that even extreme violations of human
rights could be justified, when terrorism is involved.
Perhaps tellingly, the Gibson report was never completed after
startling evidence regarding the treatment of Libyan dissidents was
uncovered. That revelation resulted in orders for the termination of
the Report project and an internal police investigation into the
Libyan matter.127 Due to this about-face, many have again expressed
concerns that the issue will not be adequately addressed due to bias.
First, those being investigated felt that the writers of the Gibson
Report had ulterior motives,128 and those writers again made the
124 See Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture
of Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-detainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8] (“MI6 officers were under no
obligation to report breaches of the Geneva conventions.”).
125 See Concerns and Recommendations on the United Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 22, 2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/ human-rights-watch-concerns-and-recommendations-united-kingdom
[https://perma.cc/W9JZ-6SUV] (noting that the Gibson Report “was shelved by
the government in January 2012 before it had concluded its work or questioned any
witnesses, after nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) strongly criticised its inadequate powers and lack of independence.”).
126 Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture of
Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-detainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8].
127 Id. Of the two Libyan cases, one “has reached an out-of-court settlement of
£2.2m from the British government.” In the other case, the plaintiff is seeking an
apology in the courts, and a symbolic compensation of £3. Id. The matter is as of
yet unresolved. Id.
128 See Kent Roach, Public Inquiries as an Attempt to Fill Accountability Gaps Left
by Judicial and Legislative Review, in CRITICAL DEBATES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM JUD.
R., 183, 195 (Fergal F. Davis & Fiona de Londras eds., 2014) (“[T]he fact that Gibson
had been a judge did not guarantee that he would be perceived to be independent.
Controversy immediately arose over Gibson’s appointment because he had served
as an Intelligence Services Commissioner (ISC) from 2006 until his appointment to
head the Detainee Inquiry in 2010. The ISC has statutory oversight duties with respect to covert surveillance and covert human sources used by the security services,
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same accusations once the investigative procedure was
internalized.129 Indeed, “[d]espite promises by David Cameron and
the former justice secretary, Ken Clarke, that investigations would
be continued by an independent, judge-led inquiry, the government
. . . handed over the task to the intelligence and security committee
of selected MPs and peers.”130 The Gibson Report thus concluded
with unanswered questions in bold-faced print about the level of
involvement and participation in the torture that may have been
committed by British soldiers.131 Even though it identified over 200
reported cases of British involvement in illegal torture of detainees,
and selected forty of those cases as deserving “particular attention”
none have been addressed.132
This potential obstruction of justice echoes the allegations that
the British government faced during the Troubles. Many of the
counter-terrorism activities allegedly used then appear to still be in
use now, albeit with more modern technology. The government’s
including otherwise illegal actions outside the United Kingdom. Both the parliamentary opposition and civil society groups raised concerns that Gibson may have
in confidential reports already reviewed some of the matters that the inquiry would
review. Clive Stafford Smith on behalf of the Reprieve suggested that Gibson might
even be a valuable witness before his inquiry, and that applying the judicial standards of bias, he should recuse himself.”).
129 See UK: Broken Promise on Torture Inquiry, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 21,
2013), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/21/uk-broken-promisetorture-inquiry [https://perma.cc/43Y5-J9VV] (noting that “[t]he government announced on December 19, though, that it would hand responsibility for further investigations to the Intelligence and Security Committee rather than establishing a
judicial inquiry that addresses all the shortcomings of the Gibson inquiry;” lamenting that “[t]he Intelligence and Security Committee has a poor track record of holding the intelligence agencies to account for their role in renditions and overseas torture. . . .”; and quoting Benjamin Ward, the deputy director of the Europe and
Central Asia division at Human Rights Watch, in stating that “[t]he Intelligence and
Security Committee lacks the independence, transparency, and credibility to investigate these extremely serious issues. The serious questions raised by the Gibson
report and the wider evidence of UK complicity in overseas torture can only be
resolved by an independent judicial inquiry.”).
130 Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture of
Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-detainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8].
131 See id. (“Gibson's concerns are reflected in a series of passages, set in bold
print in his report, identifying issues described as ones ‘the inquiry would have
wished to investigate.’”).
132 Id.
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active participation in human rights violations linked to the
Troubles has hopefully ceased, but the government nonetheless
continues to deny requests for open police investigations, reports by
the Historical Inquires Team (created for the express purpose of
reporting on historical cases), trials, and inquests.133
Interestingly, further evidence has surfaced that many of the
same intelligence-gathering techniques used by the British Forces
during the Troubles remain in use today. Due to this fact, often,
when a Troubles-related trial is pursued, the government refuses to
turnover armed forces’ documentation of their Troubles-related
actions, as they claim the documents are too sensitive and may
jeopardize the safety of current military operations.134
This declaration obviously reveals the similarity between the
strategies and information-gathering processes employed during
the Troubles and those employed against terrorists today. That
likeness also suggests that jurisprudence arising out of the fact
patterns of Troubles cases would also be applicable to modern day
terrorism cases, and thus could impact how terrorism is addressed
today. Because Great Britain and other Western countries continue
to refuse basic judicial rights to recompense citizens who suffer from
collateral damage wreaked in the pursuit of suspected terrorists (or
if deceased, their families), a body of jurisprudence from a respected
domestic court would not only resolve the injustices of the past, but
be binding on the actions of current counter-terrorism operations as
well. As a respected system of justice, the British courts’ rulings
could impact not only their own country’s acts, but by condemning
such acts, could also influence the international sphere and
encourage others to follow suit.

133 The DPP must establish criminal trial proceedings, but has repeatedly declined to prosecute. An aggrieved family member cannot call for a criminal trial
independently of the government.
134 For example, the ECtHR summary of the case of Pearse Jordan, at paragraph 32(a), holds that certain categories of information would be withheld on
“grounds of national security.” Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 94
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8 (2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJJ].
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3. ATTEMPTS TO LITIGATE TROUBLES’ CASES
3.1. Domestic Struggles
As discussed above, a body of jurisprudence would prove
invaluable to current human rights activists and the survivors of the
Troubles, who are both still reeling from the violence. The reasons
for the absence of any jurisprudence in this area is not due to a lack
of effort on the part of potential plaintiffs. Though instrumental in
attaining peace, the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the
Belfast Agreement) instituted no comprehensive mechanism to deal
with the seemingly endless body of un-litigated claims that the
events of the Troubles left in its wake. Today, a hapless
conglomeration of official organizations takes a piece-meal
approach towards reconciling the judicial claims. Known by some
who deal with the offices as the “package of measures,” the services
offered by offices such as the Historical Enquiries Team (“HET”),
Office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland, (“OPONI”),
Coroners’ Office, Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”, known
formerly as the Royal Ulster Constabulary or “RUC”), and Public
Prosecution Service (“PPS”) have been likened to a leaking wall,
struggling to hold back the tide of litigation.135 Whenever one crack
in the wall grows too large, and the flood of cases can no longer be
contained, another acronym is slapped on to address the problem.
Forgotten and neglected cases trickle through everywhere,
however, and overall the approach is failing.136 Although this poetic
and apt metaphor was articulated by a community service center
within Belfast, international non-governmental organizations also
agree with this assessment.
For example, “Amnesty
[International]’s report shows that families have been failed by
processes conducted by the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s
Historical Enquiries Team, the Office of the Police Ombudsman and
various coroners’ inquests . . . .”137
135 Analogy attributed to Shauna Carberry. Interview with Shauna Carberry,
Employee, Relatives for Justice, in Belfast, Northern Ireland (June 2013).
136 Id.
137 Northern Ireland: Amnesty Slams Failure to Deal with Past, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL UK PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-amnesty-slams-failure-deal-past
[perma.cc/KN8B-TK9F].
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As a result of this unorganized and stagnant situation, some
victims and their families, who are anxious to learn more about the
exact circumstances of their loved ones’ deaths, have engaged in
Public Inquiries; unofficial presentations of evidence at community
centers or town halls, designed to encourage media attention for
their cases. The primary goal in such an Inquiry is not to determine
a perpetrator, but rather to present evidence in such a way that
suggests the government prematurely closed the investigations
without aptly considering pertinent evidence.138
One such Public Inquiry addressed the murder of Gerard
Lawlor. His is the most recent sectarian killing to date in Northern
Ireland, and many hope the last and final murder in the style of the
Troubles.139 His case was also one of the first to be investigated by
the PSNI, the newly assembled Northern Irish police force meant to
take the place of the RUC,140 which was overtly sympathetic to the
Protestant cause and over 92% Protestant in make-up at times.141
Significantly, the shooting also came after the implementation of the
United Kingdom Human Rights Act in 2000.142 The Act adopts
many of the provisions of the European Convention of Human
Rights (“ECHR”), and declares unlawful any act by a public body or
official that contradicts the ECHR.143 As the ECHR requires a

138 See e.g., Ian Cobain, UK Accused of Helping to Supply Arms for Northern Ireland
Loyalist Kilings (Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.theguardian.com/
uk/2012/oct/15/uk-arms-northern-ireland-loyalist-massacre (describing the motivations of family members who have brought suit against the Ministry of Defence
and the Police Service of Northern Ireland as an “aim to uncover the truth”).
139 See generally Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommendations 2 (Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU].
140 Id.
141 The Search for Peace: The Royal Ulster Constabulary, BBC, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/profiles/ruc.stm [perma.cc/ZF9K-GVT7] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (noting that allegations of collusion between the RUC and Protestant militants continued until the
force was replaced by the PSNI).
142 See generally Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommendations 2 (Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU].
143 See “How the Human Rights Act Works,” Liberty Protecting Civil Liberties, Promoting Human Rights, available at https://www.liberty-human-rights. org.uk/human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act/how-human-rights-actworks [ https://perma.cc/Q3JE-9YWG] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (explaining that
“[i]t is unlawful for any public authority to act incompatibly with human rights
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prompt and effective government investigation into potential
human rights violations, many hoped that in the case of Gerard
Lawlor, the threat of illegality would ensure that an investigation
would indeed be forthcoming. Though this Act would have some
significance in the government’s handling of other historical cases,
to the great disappointment of many human rights activists in
Northern Ireland, it has yet to cause any official effect in the case of
Gerard Lawlor.144
In 2002, Lawlor was shot as he walked home from a pub on the
Antrim Road,145 a well-known thoroughfare through a
predominantly Catholic neighborhood.146 His location assured his
attackers that he was likely a Catholic.147 Five other shooting attacks
on Catholic pedestrians in Catholic neighborhoods occurred that
night, but the police chose not to investigate them as potentially
connected, and indeed chose not to investigate one of the attacks
altogether as no one was harmed (the gun used jammed, so the
gunmen sped away). An anonymous witness came forward
(unless under a statutory duty to act in that way), and anyone whose rights have
been violated can bring court proceedings against the public authority.”).
144 Id. The panel of judges at the public inquiry did consider whether ECHR
Article 2 violations occurred concerning the right to a transparent, independent,
prompt and effective investigation in cases where the state was implicated in the
murder. See infra pp. 50-51. However, the state has failed to reopen the investigation, despite the applicability of the UK Human Rights Act.
145 See Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommendations 2
(Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU].
146 See Map, http://www.wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/maps/towns/
belfast_religion.gif [https://perma.cc/99WY-MPB3] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016)
(noting that the New Lodge district, which is bordered by the Antrim Road, is a
predominantly Catholic neighborhood); see also Sean O’Hagan, “Belfast, divided in
the name of peace,” The Guardian (Jan. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jan/22/peace-walls-troubles-belfastfeature [https://perma.cc/QE9N-KEXR] (discussing the sectarian history of the
Antrim Road, “When I meet local Sinn Féin councillor Conor Maskey in the offices
of Intercomm, a cross-community, bridge-building organisation in the Antrim
Road, he tells me that nearly a third of the deaths during the Troubles occurred in
a square mile radius of where we are sitting.”); JEFFREY A. SLUKA, DEATH SQUAD: THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF STATE TERROR 129, 152 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).
147 Id. at 2. For example, on July 29, 2001, Gavin Brett was shot and killed by
loyalist gunmen who likely presumed he was a Catholic because he was standing
at the entrance to a GAA club. Id. He was, in fact, a Protestant who was keeping a
friend company. Id. Thus, tragic mistakes based on this kind of assumption have
been made in the past.
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through a confidential tip line alleging that she had heard unknown
men boasting later the same night that Lawlor was killed that “we
done a hit on the Antrim Road. We got a wee fenian148 outside the
Bellevue Arms on the Antrim Road.”149 This tip was not
investigated or even recorded in the case files. Police later stated
that this inaction was due to an effort to protect the witness’s
identity, but many acquainted with the facts of the case question this
justification, and scoff that “such a policy beggars belief and negates
the whole purpose of setting up confidential police hotlines.”150
In Lawlor’s Inquiry, a panel of reputable judges from a variety
of NGO’s and international offices unanimously found that the case
investigation should not have been closed by the Northern Ireland
police service.151 The family also filed a complaint against the police
with the Office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland,
alleging possible collusion with the shooters or cover-up of relevant
information; the complaint has not been received a response.152
In his article analyzing the potential for a truth commission in
Northern Ireland, Kevin Connolly aptly describes British attitudes
towards legal actions against military personnel accused of
wrongdoing:
Britain has shown little inclination to allow its military and
security personnel to face sanctions for offenses carried out
in Northern Ireland. In many cases, the British state has
ignored or actively covered up the role of state agents in past
violence. Britain's attitudes towards past state violence are
148 Fenian is a derogative slang term for an Irish Catholic. See Dictionary.com,
available
at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fenian
[https://perma.cc/CKF8-G732] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“(in late Irish legends)
a member of a group of warriors always ready to defend Ireland against its enemies.”).
149 See generally Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommendations (Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU].
150 Id. at 13.
151 Id. at 39 (concluding that the PSNI and Police Ombudsman did not provide
an effective investigation in compliance with Article 2). Of course, it is always possible to debate the independence of such judges and the accuracy of such hearings,
as they are unofficial and are sponsored by families with obvious biases towards
the outcomes that they desire. Again, however, the purpose is not exclusively to
cultivate an accurate judgment about the case, but also to drum up local support
for a public inquiry, and to encourage the media to add pressure to the government
to reopen the case.
152 Id. at 10.
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predictable, and difficult to remedy, given that the transition
in Northern Ireland does not go to the heart of the British
state. Britain has little reason or incentive for exposing its
institutions and individual actors to processes of
accountability, and to the extent that groups in Northern
Ireland desire such accountability, they do not enjoy the
overall political leverage necessary to compel it.
The case of Gerard Lawlor is not the only example of judicial
inefficiency and inaction. The list is virtually endless. Nearly
everyone in Northern Ireland either knows someone who was
killed, or is aware of a family who lost a loved one. Additional
unresolved cases include those of Pearse Jordan (suspected to have
been killed by a British police officer), Denis Brown, Jackie Mailey,
James Mulvenna, William Hanna (all also suspected to have been
killed in one incident by several Special Air Services soldiers in the
British Army), Henry Cunningham, Terrence McCafferty, Sean
Brown, Rosaleen and Mervyn McDonald, Patrick Eugene Heenan,
John Doherty, Ciaran Murphy, Bernard O’Hagan, and so many
others.153 Providing these few names lends a certain concreteness to
the multitude of unresolved cases, but so many other names could
have been chosen. The overall judicial inefficiency has led some
victims and families of victims to seek assistance outside of the
United Kingdom all together.
3.2. International Judgments: The European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and the Troubles
The United Kingdom has long exhibited a notorious antipathy
towards regional European human rights bodies.154 Though
parliament ratified the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in 1951, it was

153 Victims Condemn Northern Ireland Troubles Prosecution Call, BBC (Nov. 20,
2013), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25021286 (noting a variety of unsolved Troubles’ –related violence cases and quoting the Democratic Unionist Party’s representative, Jeffrey Donaldson, as saying that “There are
3,000 unsolved murders in Northern Ireland and those families are entitled to the
right to pursue justice.").
154 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 892
(2013).
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“dead against anything like an international court.”155 This
skepticism has been attributed to a fear of compromising uniquely
British political practices and institutions, and of any threat to
parliamentary sovereignty.156 Even in the early 1950’s, many of the
government’s concerns rested on preserving British policies
towards political extremists.157 In an eerie echo of what the future
would bring, Lord Chancellor Jowitt complained that “the
Convention would prevent a future British government from
detaining people without trial during a period of emergency.”158
Indeed, to this day, British legislation continues to fiercely
protect the preeminence of parliamentary sovereignty over the
articles of the ECHR. Only with the Human Rights Act of 1998 did
the United Kingdom officially declare that it would be unlawful for
any public body to act in a way incompatible with the Convention.
Even then, an exception applies if a public body is following
primary legislation issued by Parliament and the wording of the
legislation cannot be construed in any way other than to contradict
the ECHR.159 With this act, the United Kingdom also agreed to “take
into account,” but not necessarily adhere to, any judgment from the
European Court of Human Rights.160
What did this mean for the victims of British government
collusion and brutality during the Troubles? Plagued with
difficulties in having their cases heard, several families were
selected to represent all those who wanted their stories heard and,
more importantly, wanted the truth regarding the role the
government played in their loved one’s deaths. Two cases are
examined here because they showcase international opinion, as well
155 Id. at 893 (citing Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT. ORG. 217, 238 (2000)) (quoting W.E.
Beckett, “legal advisor to the Foreign Office and the initiator of the British government’s participation [in the drafting of the ECHR]”).
156 Id.
157 See generally id.
158 Id. at 894.
159 See Human Rights Act, (1998) § 3, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents [perma.cc/U8VS-PJT4] (stating that the Act
does not “affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation; and does not affect the validity, continuing operation or
enforcement of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility.”).
160 Id. at § 2.
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as demonstrate the level of “account” taken, in Britain, for the
judgment of the ECtHR.
3.2.1. The Case of Patrick Finucane
The murder of human rights attorney Pat Finucane is one of the
most well-known tragedies of the Troubles. Finucane was shot and
killed by two loyalist gunmen in front of his family during dinner at
their home on the evening of February 12, 1989.161 Strong allegations
of organized and institutionalized government collusion in the
killing have circulated since that time.162 Finucane’s murder is
unique in that the immediate circumstances of his death became
relatively well-known (many victims’ families were not afforded
such clarity), but Finucane’s family was not satisfied by mere
knowledge of the circumstances of his death. Even an apology from
the Prime Minister himself has not placated them. They continue to
press for disclosure of government records and a full public inquiry,
which they believe could reveal the purposeful and systematic
targeting of victims by the government, as well as collusion with
paramilitary forces to achieve the deaths of those victims.163 Such a
revelation could serve an important role in establishing
jurisprudence to prevent such government atrocities against its own
people in the future.
No evidence has ever surfaced that Finucane was a member of
the IRA or any other Republican organization. Rather, Finucane
defended detainees alleged to be paramilitaries on both sides of the
161 See Q&A, The murder of Pat Finucane, BBC (June 26, 2015), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-20683378
[https://perma.cc/HRE5-52FN].
162 Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder of Belfast Human Rights
Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 6,
3297, 3304 (2006) (noting that “What makes Finucane's assassination differentthough arguably not unique-is that, according to sixteen years of investigations, the
British Army and the RUC police were complicit in his murder.”).
163 See Q&A, The murder of Pat Finucane, BBC (June 26, 2015), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-20683378
[https://perma.cc/HRE5-52FN] (“The Finucane family have campaigned for a full
public inquiry into the murder for many years and have repeatedly insisted that
they will not accept anything less. The Finucanes believe that a public inquiry,
where the veracity of documents and witnesses can be tested under cross-examination, is the best way of getting to the truth about the extent of security force collusion and exactly who knew what.”).
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conflict,164 but it was his representation of alleged IRA members that
likely prompted his targeting and killing.165 A mere five weeks prior
to his death, Finucane received death threats delivered, via his
clients, by officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.166 These
included specific comments by police officers that Finucane would
“meet his end” and was “getting took out.”167 Clients also reported
that Finucane was abused and threatened by police officers
generally when he came to visit them at holding centers to prepare
for cases.168 Less than a month before Finucane’s death, Douglas
Hogg MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the
Home Department, announced the government sentiment that “I
have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there are in
Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly
sympathetic to the cause of the IRA.”169 This statement was later
found to be unsubstantiated by fact.170
Following his death, Finucane’s family was adamant that these
claims
and
threats
receive
adequate
investigation.
Uncharacteristically, the Finucane case received a police
investigation that was somewhat complete, when compared to other
murders that occurred during the Troubles. Certainly though, it
was not nearly adequate by normal western standards. The murder
weapons, which had been previously reported as stolen from Ulster
Defense Regiment’s barracks, were actually found.171 The Ulster

164 Finucane v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29178/95, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2
(2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=00122606#{"itemid":["001-22606"]} [perma.cc/JEG2-ZWWM] (discussing the circumstances of the case, at subsection A of “The Facts”).
165 Terceno, supra note 54, at 3303 (citing the Cory Report).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Finucane v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29178/95, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2
(2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=00122606#{"itemid":["001-22606"]} [perma.cc/JEG2-ZWWM] (“[C]lients reported that
police officers often abused and threatened to kill [Finucane] during interrogations
at holding centres . . . .”).
169 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164.
170 Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder of Belfast Human Rights
Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM LAW
REVIEW, 3297, 3303 (2006) (noting that Hogg’s statements, based on information provided by the RUC, were determined unfounded by the Stevens enquiry).
171 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3, ¶¶ 15, 18; see also Terceno
at 3304 (“One of the weapons used to gun down Finucane had been stolen from the
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Freedom Fighter172 members in possession of the guns were
convicted of possessing stolen property in April of 1990, but the
police determined that those individuals had not been in possession
of the guns at the time of the murder.173 The Finucane family was
also granted an inquest to determine the cause of death, but it lasted
one day and the family was not able to give a statement concerning
the threats made against Finucane by the RUC, as this was deemed
“not relevant to the proceedings.”174
In the fall of 1989, the RUC assigned Deputy Chief Constable
John Stevens to investigate allegations of collusion between
government security forces and loyalist paramilitaries.175 His report
revealed non-institutionalized, isolated incidents of collusion
between Protestant paramilitary groups and the Ulster Defense
Regiment,176 but no collusion within the RUC.177 Allegations of bias
have since surfaced because the report was commissioned by the
RUC and also resulted in extremely favorable findings for the police.
Nonetheless, fifty-nine men were charged as a result of the report,

British Army Ulster Defense Regiment’s barracks by a quartermaster named William Stobie, who was both an agent for the RUC and a member of the paramilitary
UDA. Stobie was later charged with weapon theft and Finucane’s murder, but was
shot dead by another paramilitary group before his trial concluded.”).
172 The Ulster Defense Regiment was an illegal loyalist terrorist branch of the
Ulster Defense Association.
173 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3, ¶ 15.
174 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3.
175 Jason Rodrigues, Pat Finucane Timeline: From 1989 Murder to 2012 Report,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 1012), available at http://www.theguardian.com/
theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2012/dec/12/pat-finucane-timeline-murderreport [https://perma.cc/4LNH-FDTJ] (In September of 1989, “Allegations that security forces colluded with loyalist groups to have republican targets killed prompt
the government to send the then deputy chief constable of Cambridgeshire police,
John Stevens, to Northern Ireland to investigate. Stevens' appointment is the first
of the three inquiries he is to run.”).
176 Northern Ireland government armed forces.
177 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 5, ¶ 23; CAIN Web Service,
Collusion – Chronology of Events in the Stevens Inquiries, available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z9WUGXDV] (“A summary of the report of the Stevens Inquiry was published (first inquiry). The main finding of the report was that there had been evidence of collusion
between members of the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. However, it
was the view of the inquiry that any collusion was "restricted to a small number of
members of the security forces and is neither widespread nor institutionalized.").
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including undercover agent Brian Nelson.178 Nelson worked as the
Chief Intelligence Officer for the illegal loyalist paramilitary group
known as the Ulster Defense Association while funneling
information to the British government. Nelson’s handlers, British
officials who liaised with the undercover agents, claimed that
Nelson had “gotten out of hand and had become personally
involved in loyalist murder plots.”179 After this revelation the issue
of whether Nelson had gone rogue within the organization or
whether his activities were known to, and condoned by, his British
handlers then became highly contested.180 After his conviction,
Nelson manifested that he had independently chosen to target
Finucane (rebutting allegations that his handlers had requested that
Nelson suggest the hit), but that contrary to the government
position, he had informed his handlers of the intended murder.181
Presuming Nelson’s testimony was accurate, however, then
Finucane was inexplicably neither warned by British intelligence of
any such threat nor protected by the police, despite that they had
allegedly been made aware of the hit by Nelson.182
Nelson’s confession to his involvement in Finucane’s murder
was passed to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and an
additional inquiry into the situation was ordered.183
Once
completed, the findings of the inquiry were sensitive enough to be
earmarked as confidential,184 but the DPP suggested that the inquiry
lacked sufficient evidence and declined to prosecute Nelson or any
other suspects.185 In relation to civil proceedings that alleged her
husband’s murder was committed by or with the connivance,
knowledge or encouragement of the Ministry of Defence and Brian
Nelson, Finucane’s widow, Geraldine, requested the opportunity to
Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 5, ¶ 23, 24.
Id.
180 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 5, ¶ 24-28 (Not only was
Nelson tried, but while in prison he confessed to involvement in the crime in a BBC
Panorama programme, which was then sent to the Chief Constable of the RUC for
further inquiries. However, in 1995 the DPP concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant prosecution.).
181 Id.
182 Id. Knowledge of, and failure to warn, the Finucane family of the intended
hit on Pat Finucane became one of the central claims in the Finucane case against
the government.
183 Id. at ¶ 26.
184 Id. at ¶ 28.
185 Id.
178
179
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view originals of the documents.186 In 1999, the Ministry responded,
claiming it was no longer in possession of the documents.187
Shockingly, a taped confession of gunman Ken Barratt was also
“lost.”188 At this time, Geraldine Finucane petitioned the European
Court of Human Rights to hear the case.
Meanwhile, the government ordered a third inquiry. Later that
year, criminal charges were brought against William Alfred Stobie,
a paid police informer, for the murder of Pat Finucane.189 Stobie
testified that “he gave the police information on two occasions
before the Finucane murder which was not acted upon” and that for
the past ten years police had been in possession of information that
could have convicted Stobie for other paramilitary offenses, but they
declined to do so.190 Two years after the charges were brought, the
case against Stobie fell apart when the central witness refused to
testify. Shortly after his release, Stobie was gunned down by loyalist
paramilitaries.191
In February of 2002, the ECtHR agreed to hear the Finucane case.
After hearing the evidence, the Court determined that Article Two
of the European Convention of Human Rights was indeed
implicated in the facts of the case. Article Two provides that:
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this Article when it results from the use of
force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence [sic] of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the

Id. at ¶ 31.
Id.
188 Yasmine Ahmed, BIRW Response to Stevens 3, British Irish Rights Watch
(June 19, 2015) available at http://rwuk.org/inquiries/birw-response-to-stevens-3/
[https://perma.cc/AGC2-BYUX].
189 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3, ¶ 16.
190 Id. at 8, ¶ 36.
191 Id. at ¶ 38.
186
187
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escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a
riot or insurrection.”192
In relevant part, procedural interpretation of Article Two
requires that a full investigation take place to determine whether a
victim has been impermissibly deprived of life within the provisions
of the Convention. ECtHR case law specifically requires that, in
order to qualify as an appropriate investigation,
[T] he state's response to lethal force deaths caused by state
actors must be (1) prompt; (2) independent, meaning that the
investigators must be institutionally and hierarchically
separate from the state institution (e.g. the military or police)
accused of causing the death; (3) effective, in the sense of
producing evidence that can lead to prosecutions of
responsible individuals where this is warranted; and (4)
transparent, both to the public at large as well as to the
family members of the victim.193
In July of 2003, the Court came down with the opinion that the
circumstances of Finucane’s death and subsequent investigation
warranted the application of Article Two provisions, and finally
determined that indeed, a violation of the Convention had
occurred.194 Because the police investigation of the murder had been
conducted by the same officers that were suspected of making death
threats to Finucane, this constituted an impermissible lack of
independence under Article Two. Also, because these threats and
the allegations of collusion were never examined at all, the
investigation was not effective under the meaning of Article Two.195
In the eyes of the Court, the fact that the investigation was still
ongoing ten years after the murder violated the requirement of
promptness in the eyes of the Court. Finally, because no
192 European Convention on Human Rights, Article Two Section I (Rights and
Freedoms) 6, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/US7V-73GS] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
193 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 423.
194 Finucane v. the United Kingdom – Summary, NETHERLANDS INST. OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, UTRECHT SCHOOL OF LAW, available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/
caselaw/Hof.nsf/2422ec00f1ace923c1256681002b47f1/
93b44b6e80ca191841256d58002eaf1f?OpenDocument [perma.cc/JEG2-ZWWM].
195 Id.
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documentation had been made public to either the community at
large or the family, the investigation lacked the necessary
transparency that the Convention demanded. Thus, on all four
procedural requirements the government failed to uphold its
human rights obligations under the Convention. The court
recommended an independent public inquiry to determine the truth
of the allegations.
At the time that the ECtHR was considering Finucane’s case, the
Good Friday Agreement was also nearing completion. Part of the
agreement stipulated that an independent international judge
would consider six cases alleging government collusion to
determine if additional public inquiries were necessary. Finucane’s
case was among those chosen for consideration, and many hoped
that this would result in the public investigation that both the Court
and the family demanded. Perhaps surprisingly, in accordance with
the Good Friday Agreement, the independent international judge
completed his investigation and published a report of his findings.
Judge Cory’s report indeed found that four of the six cases had
strong implications of collusion, and recommended that the public
inquiries take place.196
In 2004, the government agreed to conduct the inquires, but
subsequently passed the Inquires Act in 2005, shifting control over
public inquiries from the legislative to the executive branch.197 The
government stated that evidence compromising national security
interests made cases like Pat Finucane’s the exclusive domain of the
executive, and then declined to pursue the inquiry. The Finucane
family has pointed to the indication that Finucane’s case would
implicate national security interests as evidence suggesting that the
government was indeed involved in the murder, and that it was an
official act and not a result of Nelson acting as a rogue agent.198
Indeed, it is hard to see why a murder that was unplanned by, and
unbeknownst to state actors could implicate sensitive national
security information. Additionally, international human rights
groups expressed outrage at the passage of the Inquiries Act,
declaring that it further violated the United Kingdom’s obligations
Terceno, supra note 59, at 3301.
Id.
198 Interview with John Finucane, Solicitor and son of Pat Finucane, Belfast,
Northern Ireland (June 2013).
196
197
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under the ECHR because the Act allows the government to withhold
information on state involvement in a murder.199
In 2011, the government ordered a paper-based review of
Finucane’s death. The investigation was handled by Sir Desmond
De Silva, and resulted in a report hundreds of pages in length that
ultimately implicated the government in “shocking collusion” with
Protestant paramilitaries that resulted in Finucane’s death. The De
Silva Report acknowledged:
[A] number of ways in which the State and its agents
colluded in the Finucane killing, including: leaking
information to loyalist paramilitaries, amongst them the
UDA; failing to act on information that Finucane was under
threat of attack by loyalist paramilitaries; playing “key roles”
in the actual killing, including by facilitating access to the
murder weapon; refusing to investigate, arrest and
prosecute UDA operatives at the time, despite evidence of
their criminality; and covering up collusion in the killing for
over two decades.200
Undoubtedly, British officials hoped that the report, coupled
with a public apology by the Prime Minister David Cameron, would
placate the family and settle the Finucane case for good, thereby
avoiding actual litigation on the issue.201 However, the documents
that form the basis of the De Silva report have not been released,

Terceno, supra note 59, at 3301.
Northern Ireland: 25 Years After Finucane Killing, Failure to Hold Inquiry Not
Only Cruel, But Positively Sinister, AMNESTY INT’L UK PRESS RELEASES (Feb. 12, 2014,
10:45 AM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-25years-after-finucane-killing-failure-hold-inquiry-not-only-cruel [perma.cc/FGQ4Q7UN].
201 Brian Rowan, Pat Finucane Killing: Why Murder of Lawyer is a Death That
Never Went Away, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/debateni/blogs/brian-rowan/pat-finucane-killing-why-murder-oflawyer-is-a-death-that-never-went-away-29994732.html [perma.cc/6LBN-BCRF].
199
200
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even to the family,202 despite promises to publicize them203 as well
as other reports concerning the views of other prominent ministers
drafted at the time of the violence. The family thus remains
unsatisfied.204
At the twenty-five year anniversary of Finucane’s death, Rights
Watch UK publicly wrote to Whitehall to remind the Prime Minister
of his promise to publish the reports.205 They have not received a
response.206 Perhaps more importantly, the Finucane family now
demands a full public inquiry not only for the sake of determining
exactly how and why the government interacted with loyalist
paramilitaries in their father’s killing, but to determine the extent of
government involvement in the violence of the Troubles overall.207
Currently, the government has expressed no intention of adhering
to the demands of the ECtHR opinion that it complete its
202 British Irish Rights Watch, Pat Finucane: The Fight for Justice, ¶ 24, available
at
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&
ved=0ahUKEwjKzOOB_ujLAhWJ8x4KHbCyCXgQFggfMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment_data%2Ffile%2F246867%2F0802.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFlq56Si_rr9x1XYmjV2M
Rq39KC6g [https://perma.cc/E63K-2XFW] (explaining that “Not only would the
Finucane family be denied sight of many crucial documents, but they would not
even know which documents they were being denied.”).
203 Finucane Lawyer to Publish Classified Reports, RTE NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011),
available
at
http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/1110/308531-finucanep/
[https://perma.cc/X6EM-HAQQ] (“The lawyer appointed by the British government to carry out a review of the murder of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane and the
collusion of the British security services in the killing, has said he intends to declassify and publish original intelligence documents alongside his report.”).
204 British Irish Rights Watch, Pat Finucane: The Fight for Justice, supra note
202(noting that when the government explained the plan for the de Silva report,
“[t]his process fell so far short of the family’s most basic requirements that Geraldine Finucane brought the meeting to an end after just 30 minutes.”); see also British
Irish Rights Watch, press release, “27 years since the murder of Patrick Finucane:
still no justice” available at http://rwuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
Finucane-27-PR.pdf.
205 Broken Promises and Opportunities Lost – The Finucane Case – An Update,
RIGHTS WATCH (UK) (Jan. 11, 2014, 12:49PM), http://www.rwuk.org/all/ finucanccase-update/ [https://perma.cc/9CVJ-VHJ8] (“The failure of the Prime Minister to
expeditiously publish the views of his Ministers regarding the murder of Patrick
Finucane and role of the British state in his death only serve to heighten the suspicion surrounding this case and that the de Silva review has raised more questions
than it has provided answers.”).
206 Id.
207 Northern Ireland: 25 Years After Finucane Killing, supra note 200.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

1138

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:3

investigatory obligations under the ECHR, and has not responded
to the requests of the Finucane family.
3.2.2. The Case of Pearse Jordan
On November 25, 1992, Pearse Jordan was shot and killed by a
member of the RUC, identified in legal documentation as Sergeant
A.208 According to eyewitnesses, Jordan, who was known to be a
volunteer member of the IRA, was driving a car that was rammed
by police officers.209 He was unarmed, got out of the car and
attempted to flee on foot when he was shot three times in the back.
In contrast with the unofficial reports circulated to the media, the
car contained no explosives, masks, guns, or other paramilitary
paraphernalia.210 Jordan died a short time after the shooting, and
the case has become known as one implicating the shoot-to-kill
policies of the police Special Support Unit, or SSU.211 The SSU had
been involved in six similar shootings previously.212 The shootings
sparked outrage when evidence showed that all six victims were
unarmed and all of the SSU task members involved, including
Sergeant A, had made false statements to cover up the truth of the
incidents.213
In May of 1993, the RUC completed an investigation into the
shooting and submitted its findings to the DPP.214 The family was
notified that the investigation was complete, and that it was deemed
“satisfactory,” but was not actually informed of any findings.215 This
208 Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(April 8, 2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJJ].
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Barry McCaffrey, RUC Man Who Shot Unarmed PIRA Man Told Doctor Job
Had Been ‘Great Until Ceasefire,’ THE DETAIL (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/135/pearse-jordan-shoot-to-kill-inquest/ruc-man-who-shot-unarmed-pira-man-told-doctor-job-had-been-great-until-ceasefire [perma.cc/PH8WUDBM].
212 Id.
213 Id. (In 1995, Sergeant A complained to an RUC doctor that his job had been
“great, until the ceasefire,” intimating that the absence of armed conflict in Northern Ireland rendered his job boring).
214 Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(April 8, 2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJJ].
215 Id.
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was a far more typical conclusion to investigatory findings for most
of the families of victims of Troubles aggression, as compared to the
modicum of information that the Finucane family received. In
November of the same year, the DPP notified the RUC that the
evidence from the investigation was insufficient to warrant
prosecution of any individual. The RUC in turn notified the
Coroner’s office of the finding, and the Coroner decided to hold an
inquest.216 Approximately one year later, the Coroner received the
investigation report from the police, and notified the family that the
inquest was scheduled to begin in January of 1995.217 Prior to the
inquest, the Secretary of State for Defense suggested, and the
Coroner agreed, that certain sensitive information would be
withheld from the proceeding for national security reasons, and that
the identities of the officers involved would be kept confidential.
Later, additional information was withheld for fear of
“compromising the integrity of RUC operations.”218 Presumably
then, these operations were still ongoing.
Over the course of the inquest, as new evidence emerged, the
family repeatedly requested that the DPP reconsider its decision not
to prosecute, and in the alternative suggested that the coroner was
not conducting the inquest fairly. These requests delayed the
inquest, which was eventually concluded in 2000, five years later,
without resolution. Requests for judicial review (a process
equivalent to an appeal in the United States), as well as
complications with requests for legal aid, financial assistance for the
family, and suggestions that vital police investigation information
was being withheld from the family and their attorney were also
handled with impermissible slowness, further delaying the process.
Due to the hindrance, the ECtHR eventually agreed to hear the case.
After merely one year, on May 4, 2001, the ECtHR concluded
that international law applied to the facts of the case, including the
United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officials, which provides that the “intentional
lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable
216 An inquest is an extremely limited investigation, designed only to determine who the deceased was, and how, when and where the deceased’s death came
about. Generally, an inquest is not meant to apportion criminal liability to the cause
of death. Id. at ¶44.
217 Id.
218 Id. at ¶ 33.
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in order to protect life.”219 The ECHR was also implicated, including
specifically Article Two, cited above.220
The court held that no factual findings could be made because
the fact-finding portion of the investigation had not yet been
completed to the Court’s satisfaction (despite the “satisfactory”
investigation that the police assured the family had been
completed).221 The Court instead found that the investigations were
carried out by the police force with an impermissible absence of
independence.222 The victim’s family was also inadequately
informed of the proceedings, and an overall lack of public scrutiny
permeated the process.223 The fact that the officer who shot Jordan
could not be compelled to attend the inquest as a witness was also a
serious shortcoming. Finally, “the absence of legal aid for the
representation of the victim’s family and non-disclosure of witness
statements prior to their appearance at the inquest prejudiced the
ability of the applicant to participate in the inquest and contributed
to long adjournments in the proceedings.”224
The Court further considered whether the procedural aspects of
Article Two had been complied with, and found violations there as
well.225 Generally, the procedural aspects of Article Two require a
prompt, transparent, independent and thorough investigation
whenever a state has been implicated in the death of a citizen.226
Regarding the delays causing the inquest to last over five years, the
Court concluded that “the time taken in this inquest cannot be
regarded as compatible with the State’s obligation under Article
Two of the Convention to ensure that investigations into suspicious

219 G.A. Res. 45/166, United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9 (1990).
220 See supra pp. 35-36.
221 Jordan v. United Kingdom, ¶ 23, App. No. 24746/94, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr.
8,
2011)
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJI] (reciting
the ICPC’s claim that “the criminal investigation into the shooting was satisfactory”).
222 Id. at ¶ 142.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at ¶ 115 (stating that the investigation may not merely lead to the awarding of damages, but “must be able to lead to the identification and punishment of
those responsible”).
226 Id. at ¶ 105-08.
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deaths are carried out promptly and with reasonable expedition.”227
The Court concluded by admonishing the state for practices that run
counter to the professed goals of the domestic courts of “allaying
suspicions and rumours” and warned that “[l]ack of such
procedures will only add fuel to fears of sinister motivations, as is
illustrated inter alia by the submissions made by the applicant
concerning the alleged shoot-to-kill policy.”228
Following the European Court’s judgment, the Coroner
scheduled the Inquest to resume in June of 2001, but the start was
delayed and did not in fact begin until February of 2002. The family
challenged the decision to delay, but their objection was denied.
Various additional challenges and delays concerning the
proceedings ensued,229 until eventually the Coroner agreed to recuse
himself in 2009.230 The proceedings again began in 2010, and
resulted in a hopelessly divided jury verdict in the fall of 2012.231
Undeterred, the diligent family motioned to quash the jury verdict,
Id. at ¶ 140.
Id. at ¶ 144.
229 These delays included a successful challenge to the Coroner’s decision to
ignore the ECtHR judgment and proceed on the basis of “existing Coroner’s law
and practice,” which was not resolved until 2004. Coroner Forced to Stand Down from
Pearse Jordan Inquest, ANPHOBLACHT (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/20762 [https://perma.cc/9B8Q-Q3UL]. The issue of the
compellability of Sergeant A was also revisited, and again challenged by the family,
until finally in 2012 the Sergeant, who was by then living out of the country, agreed
of his own volition to come forward (the Court was still unable to compel his testimony as he was beyond the jurisdiction of British courts). Id.; See also Barry McCaffrey, RUC Man Who Shot Unarmed PIRA Man Told Doctor Job Had Been ‘Great Until
Ceasefire,’ THE DETAIL (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/135/pearsejordan-shoot-to-kill-inquest/ruc-man-who-shot-unarmed-pira-man-told-doctorjob-had-been-great-until-ceasefire [perma.cc/PH8W-UDBM].
230 Coroner Forced to Stand Down from Pearse Jordan Inquest, ANPHOBLACHT (Oct.
15,
2009),
http://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/20762
[https://perma.cc/9B8Q-Q3UL]..
231 RUC Man Who Shot Unarmed Pearse Jordan in the Back Fails in Bid to be
Screened from Pearse’s Parents, MADDEN & FINUCANE, SOLICITORS (Feb. 20, 2016),
available at http://madden-finucane.com/2016/02/20/ruc-man-who-shot-unarmed-pearse-jordan-in-the-back-fails-in-bid-to-be-screened-from-pearses-parents/ [https://perma.cc/GU28-W27R] (detailing the “hopelessly divided” jury);
see also Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5] (noting that “the jury was split on whether
reasonable force was used, the state of belief on the part of the officer who fired the
fatal shots, and whether any alternative course of action was open to him.”).
227
228
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and requested a new inquest.232 In a landmark 129 page opinion that
came down in January of 2014, the High Court in Belfast ruled that
the inquest findings would indeed be quashed, and found the PSNI
at fault for the eleven years of delays and failing to provide
requested documentation.233 Though the Coroner and Chief
Constable have appealed this decision,234 it nonetheless gives
renewed hope that perhaps a third inquest more than a decade later,
will result in justice and resolution for the Jordan family.235
4. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
MEASURES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The judgments discussed above are meant to demonstrate not
just the lack of domestic resolution for Troubles-related cases, but
also the lack of enforcement for judgments of the ECtHR regarding
British investigation of counter-terrorism activities during the
Troubles. They also suggest a potentially gaping hole for future
enforcement of international restrictions on counter-terrorism
activities. Finally, the cases demonstrate the lengths to which the
government will go to avoid investigating these past events, in
which, until very recently, they claimed no institutional
involvement. Despite the dogged attempts of victims’ families and
the edicts of international bodies to the contrary, the state has
steadfastly refused to meaningfully investigate these historical
cases. In the past, the State has cited the cost of a public inquiry as
its primary reason for refusal.236 However, the importance of the
232 Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5].
233 Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5].
234 Pearse Jordan Inquest Verdict Appealed by Coroner and Chief Constable, BBC
NEWS NORTHERN IRELAND (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-26561105 [perma.cc/2GEJ-CTRU] (noting that “Lawyers for both the
coroner and chief constable are preparing challenges to the verdict.”).
235 Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5].
236 Brian Rowan, Pat Finucane Killing: Why Murder of Lawyer is a Death That
Never Went Away, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/debateni/blogs/brian-rowan/pat-finucane-killing-why-murder-oflawyer-is-a-death-that-never-went-away-29994732.html [perma.cc/6LBN-BCRF].
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issue and the degree of tenacity the state has expressed may suggest
that some underlying state motivation beyond concerns about cost.
Recent isolated admissions of, and apologies for, the supposedly
limited past government involvement in Troubles related violence,
after years of denial hints at greater institution-wide policies of
involvement hidden in the confidential documents that families,
such as the Jordans and the Finucanes seek to disclose in ongoing
litigation.
More importantly, for the purposes of this paper, the fact that
disclosures of confidential documents pose a current national
security risk suggests that the information they hide still has
applicability to current counter terrorism measures. That the British
government engaged in isolated unlawful counter-terrorism acts
during the Troubles is undisputed. The Bloody Sunday Massacre in
Londonderry on January 30, 1972, is probably the most famous of
these.237 There, Northern Irish protesters were marching in protest
of British government policies of interning suspected Irish
nationalists.238 The march had been banned, so British soldiers were
sent to disband them.239 They fired indiscriminately into the crowd,
killing thirteen and wounding an additional seventeen people.240 A
report in 1972 exonerated the British troops involved in the killing,241
and indeed it was later discovered that some of the protesters were
armed.242 However, the report was so fraught with error and “white
wash[ing]” that local citizens were outraged and even the British
government quickly distanced itself from the findings.243 For years,
237 Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.
com/this-day-in-history/bloody-sunday-in-northern-ireland [perma.cc/NWP4NP9E] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/saville_inquiry_into_bloody_Sunday [perma.cc/NWP4-NP9E] (last
visited Mar. 30, 2016) (describing testimony of Martin McGuinness, who was found
to be carrying a “Thompson sub-machine gun” at the protest during the day in
question. The previous allegations that McGuinness had fired the first shot were
dismissed as there was insufficient evidence to support this conclusion.).
243 The following year, a Coroner called the shooting “sheer, unadulterated
murder” and in 1974 the government made “goodwill” payments to the families,
though they failed to admit to any responsibility in the deaths. Id.
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individuals in both the private sector and the government expressed
a need for another investigation.244 International pressure also
mounted,245 but none was forthcoming until 1998, when Prime
Minister Tony Blair announced a judicial inquiry, headed by Lord
Saville of Newdigate.246 Its findings were released in 2010. As an
initial matter, it was concluded that none of the victims posed a
threat of causing death or serious injury to the soldiers or each
other.247 The soldiers of the paratrooper unit were indeed
determined to be at fault for their deaths.248 In a similar style to the
Finucane admission, British Prime Minister David Cameron later
made a statement that the deaths of the Bloody Sunday Massacre at
the hands of British soldiers were both “unjustified” and
“unjustifiable.”249 It is this massacre that can be perceived most
easily as a blatant violation of human rights on the part of the British
government while it engaged in counter-terrorism during the
Troubles.250
It is becoming clear that many of the measures they employed
on a systematic basis were also illegal in terms of international
human rights law. However, recent implicit acknowledgement that
the counter-terrorism strategies used during the Troubles are still
relevant to, or informative of, the measures in use today, would
suggest that the current clandestine measures remain illegal as
well.251 This deduction would neatly explain the formidable efforts

Id.
Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal, CAIN (June 1997),
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bsunday/irgovt.htm [perma.cc/UGB8-4847].
246 It was this inquiry to which British government officials pointed when they
stressed the expense of such investigations as a reason for why others of a similar
ilk should not ensue. Id.
247 “Lord Saville concluded that firing by soldiers of 1 Para on Bloody Sunday
caused the deaths of 13 people and injury to a similar number, none of whom was
posing a threat of causing death or serious injury. What happened on Bloody Sunday strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the Army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed. Bloody Sunday was a tragedy for the bereaved and the wounded, and a
catastrophe for the people of Northern Ireland." Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See generally, British Rights Watch Report, http://rwuk.org/bloody-sunday-inquiry/ [perma.cc/2QZQ-UTWN] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (similarly skeptical of the British government’s justifications for bloody Sunday massacre).
251 See generally, supra p. 54.
244
245
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government officials have made to avoid any investigations of, or
rulings on, past actions.
The fortuitousness of the timing of the ECtHR judgments and
the September 11, 2001 attacks is notable. The terrorist attacks on
September 11th constituted a turning point for international law and
terrorism. Though there had been atrocities in the past that had
spurred a demand for new anti-terrorism legislation,252 this was by
far the most compelling incident to date. Almost immediately, the
United Nations recognized “an inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence…”253 A Counter-Terrorism Committee was
established to enforce the binding U.N. resolution that all states act
to take financial, penal and other regulatory measures against
terrorism.
However, as with most abrupt changes in legal landscape,
questions soon arose.254 Unlike during the Troubles, when British
actions were intra-national and thus flew predominantly under the
international radar, the new international climate highlighting
terrorism has placed more attention upon counter-terrorism
activities and their legality.255 In response, “[i]n 2004 . . . the Council
adopted resolutions ‘[r]eminding States that they must ensure that
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their
obligations under international law . . .”256 Amnesty International
issued warnings that defining terrorism too broadly would easily
bring State security concerns into conflict with individual human
rights.257 The European Court of Justice has expressed its opinion
lamenting the failure of the Security Council to develop an
independent and impartial body responsible for hearing and
determining the legality of various actions against individuals
252 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 384-85
(2013) (referencing Russian push for anti-terrorist legislation after an attack on a
school, by “[a] Chechnyan armed group”, resulted in the deaths of 300 civilians,
many of them children).
253 Id. at 388; see also S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
254 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 388-892
(2013) (noting that “[t]he attacks on 11 September 2001” were pivotal “in the relationships between international law, global institutions, and terrorism”).
255 Id. at 388-90 (discussing the Security Council’s establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) “to monitor the implementation” of anti-terrorist
resolutions).
256 Id. at 389 (citing S.C. Res. 1535 (2004)).
257 Id. at 387-88.
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accused of terrorism. As suddenly as it arrived, the massive tidal
wave of anti-terrorist legislation that could well have dissolved
every Troubles-victims’ claim against Great Britain, appears to be
taking an about face. International organizations are cautiously
back-pedaling. As a result, new attention to restriction upon antiterrorism measures means that historical atrocities that could well
have been swept under the rug for an eternity have taken on new
meaning. The victims of British brutality during the Troubles
cannot go back in time to protect their rights and stop the deaths that
government acts likely caused. However, litigating historical cases
may act as a springboard for the enforcement of rights for those
affected, as collateral damage, in an attempt to combat today’s
terrorist actors.
So, what exactly are the United Kingdom’s legal obligations
when they act in the name of counter-terrorism? Some argue that
human rights conventions and charters should apply generally in
these circumstances.258 Dieter Fleck suggests that “[t]o the extent
that certain aspects of internal disturbances and tensions may not be
covered by international humanitarian law, individuals remain
under the protection of international law guaranteeing fundamental
human rights.” A blanket application of human rights obligations
would also circumvent the problem in determining whether an
armed conflict is ongoing or not. Certainly, the United Kingdom has
signed a great many human rights treaties that include broad
commitments to honor the rights of individuals. Like the United
States, however, the United Kingdom has been known to employ a
host of reservations when signing a treaty. Even when signed, the
treaties are not self-executing and often carry little weight within the
greater scheme of parliamentary law, which remains sovereign. To
attain force, Parliament must ratify the treaties and often enact
complimentary legislation holding that they are enforceable within
the State, as was done with the 1998 Human Rights Act, making the
ECHR a more dominant force in domestic law. However, even when
ratified, compliance is not assured. For example, in 2007 Parliament
instituted a “control order regime” of new counter-terrorism

258 Id. at 1500 (“[I]t is a small step to suggest that such international human
rights obligations apply at all times to all armed opposition groups.”).
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legislation.259 “The high court, the court of appeal and parliament's
joint human rights committee have all said that a significant number
of the 17 control orders in force are being routinely exercised in
breach of the right to liberty under article five” of the ECHR.260
However, because courts may only issue a declaration of
noncompliance to weaken, but not overturn parliamentary law,
there is little that can truly be done to force the government to
conform to the international treaty.
Meanwhile, at the time of the Troubles, and to this day,
[v]arious international treaties protecting the right of
contracting states to introduce emergency legislation;
confusion in the international arena, and particularly in
international law, over how to handle terrorist violence; and
the mistaken application of a “hierarchy of rights” both
inside the United Kingdom and abroad contribute to the use
of liberalism to justify emergency law.261
And, as we have already seen, once emergency law is instituted
and States begin to act against terrorists, there is comparatively little
that international bodies and domestic citizens alike can do to force
States to rescind the legislation.262 In her paper entitled “Civil
Liberties, Terrorism and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the
United Kingdom,” Donahue adds the observation that, “[i]n
addition there also existed a tendency within the security forces to
support the extension of such measures as part of their arsenal in the
fight against terrorism. Once the powers had been gained, those
wielding them were unwilling to see them diminished.”263
The European regional human rights system, and within it the
ECtHR, is the most effective human rights instrument in the world,

259 Alan Travis & Vikram Dodd, Reid Warning to Judges Over Control Orders,
THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/
may/25/uk.topstories3 [perma.cc/9G67-53KY] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
260 Id. (noting that “home secretary, John Reid, made clear yesterday he is prepared to declare a ‘state of emergency’ to suspend key parts of the human rights
convention if the law lords do not overturn a series of judgments that have weakened the anti-terrorist control order regime.”).
261 Donahue, supra note 40, p. 2.
262 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying Diplock courts discussion.
263 Donahue, supra note 40, at 8.
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in terms of commanding compliance with its judgments.264 Yet the
United Kingdom has successfully eluded even the semblance of
compliance with their requests regarding investigations into the
Troubles and the historical cases. Important now is the movement
that internationally, actors are starting to take note of the lengths
that States will go to counter terrorism.265 Their attention to this
issue has reached a level that would have been unprecedented
before September 11th. In recent years, international human rights
groups and other actors have played a game of catch-up to declare
dissatisfaction with counter-terrorist measures, including those
employed by the British Government during the Troubles. The
British government undoubtedly violated a number of international
agreements prohibiting arbitrary arrests, internment, torture and
killings.266 However, prior to September 11th, perceptions in
Westminster abounded that its counter-terrorism measures “were
both necessary and acceptable outside of Great Britain, and the
symbolic importance of “antiterrorist” measures provided a direct
impetus for the . . . continued operation.”267
The pro-state security measures following September 11th, and
the more recent backlash to what was seen as an overreach by States,
has likely made many in the United Kingdom aware that its
measures are viewed as neither necessary nor acceptable. Indeed,
international reprimands now circulate, including Amnesty
International’s report, “Northern Ireland: Time to Deal With the
Past,” which criticize Great Britain, not only for presently
obstructing human rights by failing to provide adequate judicial
mechanisms so that victims of the Troubles can confront the
paramilitary groups, but also condemn the failure to atone for its
grievous past behavior.268 Relating more specifically to anti264 Matiangai Sirleaf, Course Lecture about International Human Rights at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Mar. 18, 2014) (explaining that, as compared to other human rights bodies, the European system is the most advance in
terms of its capabilities to hear and decide complaints, and those decisions receive
the highest rate of compliance).
265 Donahue’s paper is one such example.
266 See supra notes 164-177 and accompanying discussion of counter-terrorist
measures, such as the Bloody Sunday Massacre.
267 Donahue, supra note 40, at 6.
268 See generally Amnesty International, Northern Ireland: Time to Deal with
the Past (2013), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/time_to_
deal_with_the_past_0.pdf [perma.cc/N2MY-6UHH] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
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terrorism measures, in 2002 the Inter-American Commission on
human rights declared that “most fundamental fair trial
requirements cannot justifiably be suspended under either
international human rights law or international humanitarian law .
. . . including those related to terrorism, regardless of whether such
initiatives may be taken in time of peace or times of national
emergency, including armed conflict . . . .”269 Other international
bodies have made similar declarations. The arbitrary detentions,
arrests and the Diplock Courts in the United Kingdom failed these
standards and violated the international limitations on acceptable
counter-terrorism measures.
5. IMPACTS OF LITIGATING THE TROUBLES’ CLAIMS
The often forgotten fact that the Troubles were in their heyday a
mere thirty years ago, combined with the eerie similarities to some
of the tactics reportedly in use against Islamic and other terrorists
today, suggests that strong attention to Troubles litigation could
impact current anti-terrorist activities.
Justifications for current anti-terrorist measures and those used
during the Troubles are similar. Three examples of rhetoric used by
British politicians in particular resonate with arguments routinely
used at present to justify counter-terrorism legislation that also
infringes on protected human rights. First, the British Parliament
had long held the view that “Northern Ireland bears a unique
history within which special powers are acceptable, or even
necessary.”270 Thus, using special powers to handle the situation in
Northern Ireland was justified, while parliament members readily
admitted that no one in England would ever be forced to suffer such
a radical approach. The people and the scenarios were too different.
This approach of labeling was used within Northern Ireland as well,
where Protestant officials realized that they would lose popular
support if they ever utilized counter-terrorism measures against the
269

(2013).

PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 387

270 Donahue, supra note 40, at 12-13 (“[I]nternment has been one of the facts of
Irish history and one of the means for securing the State in Northern Ireland, north
or south” and describing Northern Ireland as a “place apart” and a “foreign country” (quoting MP’s in Westminster Parliament)). British politicians also noted that
no one in England would ever suffer the procedures that apply in Northern Ireland,
but that “the same situation does not apply in England.” Id. at 13.
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Loyalists.271 Particularly with internment, though the counterterrorism measures never stated that they were to be used against
Catholic paramilitary groups exclusively, at their inception that was
the understood purpose. This approach of labeling the sufferers of
human rights violations as the “other” mirrors the easy distinctions
drawn between radical Muslim terrorists and the rest of the world,
justifying their need to be treated differently, and more harshly, than
other criminals in light of their status as “unique.”
A second justification for counter-terrorist measures is that,
while the legislation may violate some civil rights, many of the acts
that are forbidden are already illegal.272 Thus, the legislation is not
inflicting undue harm. This is similar, but not identical to the idea
that, if you are not a terrorist, you likely have nothing to worry about
because you are not committing criminal activity, and so your rights
will likely not be infringed. These arguments were recently used to
encourage the passing of anti-terrorist legislation in the United
States when confronted by concerns about infringement on civil
liberties of civilians. Congressman Pence argued that the counter
terrorism measures would address only illegal behavior, and that
the legislation was “about trust. It is not about fear. It is about
trusting the law enforcement agencies of this country.”273
A third justification that transcends time is the idea that
“terrorist legislation [is] a statement that violence [will] not be
tolerated.”274 British MPs frequently supported implementing
legislation that suspended basic rights because they felt it
demonstrated that Britain rejected terrorism, and had the courage to
resist violence.275 This argument had the double-edged sword of
simultaneously implying that any repeal of counter-terrorist

271 CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVER-UP AND
A CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH 64 (2013) (explaining that when he called for tougher coun-

ter-terrorism measures, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner “realised [sic] he would lose the support of his party if Loyalists were interned.”). The
measures were, however, eventually used to intern and sentence paramilitaries of
both religious backgrounds. See generally Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8.
272 Donahue, supra note 40, at 19.
273 107 Cong. Rec. H7220 (Oct. 24, 2001) (statement of Rep. Pence), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-10-24/pdf/CREC-2001-10-24-pt1PgH7220-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P4Z-MTXD] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
274 Donahue, supra note 40, at 14-15 (positing that “statutes serve as a moral
statement”).
275 Id.
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legislation would symbolize acquiescence to terror.276 Indeed, any
opponent of the legislation had to stress that it was not “going soft
on terrorism,”277 in much the same way that Democrats stressed
their hard line opinions when critiquing Republican anti-terrorism
measures in the United States following September 11th.278 The
similarities in the arguments used thirty years ago and those
employed today are important. If the judgments concerning the
measures taken in the Troubles reveal that these arguments are not
sufficient to justify the human rights violations imposed against
Northern Ireland, then it is likely that another country will not be
capable of using similar rhetoric to defend current counter-terrorism
measures with success.
Thus, because of these parallels in both the actions taken to
counter terror, and the justifications used to excuse and prolong
them, extensive litigation of the Troubles claims would likely have
reverberating effects felt not only by the present-day counterterrorism measures employed by Great Britain, but by those
elsewhere around the world. Scholars have noted generally that
many of the factors which caused the United Kingdom to implement
extreme emergency measures that violated human rights law are
“also at work in other liberal, democratic states faced with a terrorist
challenge.”279
6. CONCLUSION
Are there means available by which the Troubles’ claims can still
be resolved?
By holding parliamentary sovereignty above
international law, the British government has apparently stymied
many attempts to apply much of international human rights
legislation to historical cases. International law on the whole faces
problems of enforcement. Perhaps the best method by which to
confront the historical cases comes from the British courts
themselves. By setting national jurisprudence on a pedestal, the
United Kingdom has created a powerful mechanism to curb
276 Id. at 14 (noting that “[i]n the absence of a cessation in terrorist activity, repeal might . . . indicate . . . a level of acceptance either of some degree of violence or
of the use of violence for political ends”).
277 Id. at 16.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 2.
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counter-terrorism measures, and the British courts are in a uniquely
capable place to do so regarding the Troubles cases because they
involved solely citizens of the United Kingdom. In recent years, the
courts have begun to take a harder stance to protect civil liberties
despite the war on terror.280 The recent decision to order a new
inquest for the Pearse Jordan case is one such example. Though they
would likely face great political opposition, should the courts decide
to get serious about forcing greater conformity to the ECHR and
human rights generally, a decision to litigate the Troubles claims
would be the perfect vehicle to do so, because those claims
specifically raise the debate between security and protecting civil
rights.
Though large scale transitional justice mechanisms will likely
never be endorsed by British officials, perhaps there are some
suggestions that British courts could take from these mechanisms
should they become more serious about litigating the Troubles’
cases. The truth commission in South Africa was well known for its
liberal use of amnesty to those who came forward, in exchange for
their honest and open recounting of past events. It remains unclear
at this point if the families of victims of the Troubles would be open
to a process that involved amnesty provisions. However, many
families stressed a desire to learn the truth about the involvement of
the British government, especially regarding the higher-up policies
of Westminster regarding Northern Ireland.281 The years of coverups and collusion seem to make them yearn merely for truth from
their government, and not for abject punishment for the
perpetrators of the crimes.282 Though by no means a thorough
consensus, the start of a conversation about the goals of the families
suggests that amnesty could be a means of compromise the British
courts might invoke.
If amnesty is not a sufficiently strong incentive to bring
witnesses and actors forward, ensuring anonymity to government
actors may be another option. In the second Jordan inquest,
280 Alan Travis & Vikram Dodd, Reid Warning to Judges Over Control Orders,
THE GUARDIAN
(May
24,
2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/may/25/uk.topstories3 [perma.cc/9G67-53KY] (last visited Jan 28, 2016)
(detailing “the continuing struggle between ministers and the courts over civil liberties and the fight against terrorism”).
281 J.R. van Hoeven, A Narrative of Historical Cases 5 (Committee for the Administration of Justice, January 2014) (unpublished manuscript).
282 Id.
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government officials and police officers involved in the crime
testified behind a screen to protect their identities. While this
method would also assist in obtaining the truth behind the deaths of
their loved ones, it has met with less enthusiasm from families. The
gratification of the truth might be somewhat tainted if the
perpetrators and the superior officials who gave the orders resulting
in victims’ deaths remain forever hidden by false names and
mysterious testimony.
If the claims from the Troubles are not resolved, the international
community should more clearly address loopholes of enforcement
in humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions and other charters
apply in times of war, but increasingly, modern warfare looks very
different from the more distinctive battles in days of old and the
enforcement of rules becomes more important. Different too from
the legacy of the past is the attention being paid to counterterrorism. Traditionally, if the international community is to break
new ground quickly regarding human rights law, the attention paid
to the issue is a needed catalyst for the change. Thus, history
suggests that if recognition of humanitarian law is to be expanded,
now is the time to do it. This paper explores the Troubles not only
because the people of Northern Ireland deserve to have this violent
chapter in their society’s history resolved, but because it may serve
to demonstrate the destruction counter-terrorism can cause if left
unchecked. Should Great Britain take responsibility for this smaller
example of destruction, then perhaps we can assign the stories of the
victims of the Troubles even greater meaning. They can be honored
not simply as lives lost, but as a vehicle to protecting the lives of
future members of society the next time justifications of counterterrorism seek to unleash an onslaught on human rights.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

